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CONNECTICUT'S AFFORDABLE HOUSING
APPEALS STATUTE: AFTER TEN
YEARS OF HOPE, WHY ONLY
MIDDLING RESULTS?
TERRY

1.

TONDRO*

It is said ... that the effect of the [zoning] ordinance is to divert
this natural development elsewhere .... But the village [of Eu
clid], though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a sep
arate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to
govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the organic law of its
creation and the State and Federal Constitutions. 1

Section 8-30g is not part of the traditional land use statutory
scheme. Traditional land use policies did not solve Connecticut's
affordable housing problem, and the legislature passed § 8-30g to
effect a change. 2
INTRODUCTION

The Connecticut Affordable Housing Appeals Act, section 8
30g of the Connecticut General Statutes ("Appeals Act"), was
adopted ten years ago. 3 It has not had an untroubled history. The
Act was the primary recommendation of the land use subcommittee
of a Blue Ribbon Commission on Housing appointed by Governor
O'Neill in 1989. I had the privilege of serving as the co-chair with
Anita Baxter, the First Selectwoman of a middle sized town on the
* © 2001 Terry J. Tondro, Thomas F. Gallivan, Jr. Professor of Property Law,
University of Connecticut School of Law. The author expresses his appreciation for the
work of research assistants in the preparation of this article, in particular Gregory Poi
trus, Alexis Schuman, Ronald Soccoli, and Robert Grady. The Article as well as my
understanding of affordable housing has been greatly enriched by working with attor
neys Philip Tegeler and Timothy Hollister. The Article has benefited from their reviews
and comments as well as those of Professor Colin Tait. Any errors are, of course, my
own.
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926).
2. Wisniowski v. Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d 1146, 1153 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
3. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (1999) (originally enacted at 1989 Conn. Acts 311
(Reg. Sess.)).
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suburban fringe of Hartford. I was an academic specializing in land
use controls, and lived in the City of Hartford itself. We were a
politically balanced team.
The Blue Ribbon Commission ("Commission") was estab
lished in response to the increasing cost of housing in Connecticut. 4
One focus of that concern was the increasingly visible and intracta
ble problem of homelessness. 5 Of equal concern were the number
of people who had access to a home, but who were paying an exces
sive portion of their income for that access. 6 At a slightly higher
economic level, there was a concern that a continuing housing cost
crisis would adversely affect the economy in Fairfield County on the
New York border. Many large corporations have offices there, and
were finding it difficult to lure executives to their headquarters be
cause of the high-cost of living in the county. Arguments were also
made that in the exclusive, high cost communities in the county,
teachers, service staff, volunteer firemen, etc. were unable to afford
to live in the communities in which they worked, and had to com
mute long distances from an affordable town to their jobs in Fair
field County. A third general argument was that those children
growing up in one of these towns could not afford to live there after
they left their parents' homes. While no other area of the state had
such high housing costs as the towns in Fairfield County, the gen
eral level of housing prices in the 1980s was very high prior to the
significant and long recession in 1989, and for several years
thereafter.
The legislation proposed by the Commission in response to the
problem of high housing costs was premised on the idea that zoning
regulation of affordable housing should be simplified to reduce the
number of generalized or indeterminate reasons that could be used
to defeat a proposal to build affordable housing, reasons such as
that the development would adversely affect community character,
or that it was unsuitable at the location proposed, or that it was
incompatible with the neighborhood. We did not go as far as many
commentators have in the 30 years since "exclusionary zoning" was
first attacked for its racial and class biases and argue for the elimi
nation of zoning altogether;7 we were simply trying to pare it back
4. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N, STATE OF CONN., HOUSING REPORT 2 (1989) [herein
after BRC IJ.
5. Id. at 19.
6. Id. at 8.
7. Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands; Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protec
tion, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 767 (1969). Sager inspired an extensive
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to its core ideas of separating basic land uses to prevent nuisances,
but only if the countervailing interest was the provision of afforda
ble housing.
The Act that our subcommittee proposed was so controversial,
however, that the life of the entire Commission was extended by a
year, in large part to gather support for the Act. 8 The Act passed
the second time around, but with some necessary compromises de
spite the very strong support of Governor O'Neill and the legisla
tive leadership. In its first 10 years, the Appeals Act was
interpreted in some 50 reported decisions by Connecticut trial
courts, plus three appellate court and two Supreme Court decisions,
which upheld its9 basic provisions.
In 1999, more or less on the tenth anniversary of the introduc
tion of the Appeals Act, the Connecticut Supreme Court dealt it a
crippling blow in Christian Activities Council, Congregational v.
Town Council.lO Some might say it was fortunate that a month ear
lier the Connecticut legislature had authorized the creation of a
new Commission to study the affordable housing problem in Con
necticut, including an examination of how section 8-30g had
worked. The 1999-2000 Blue Ribbon Commission ("BRC II") sub
mitted 36 recommendations to the Connecticut Legislature dealing
literature. A "law and economics" view began appearing at the same time, with well
known articles by Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71
(1970), and Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973). The result has been a much
more critical attitude toward land use law by legal academics from both poverty law and
market oriented critics. See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An
Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 261-65 (1984).
8. BRC I, supra note 4, at 2.
9. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n, 653 A.2d 798, 820-21 (Conn. 1995) (finding that
the commission failed to prove that denying "the plaintiffs affordable housing applica
tion was necessary to protect substantial public interest"); W. Hartford Interfaith Coali
tion, Inc. v. Town Council, 636 A.2d 1342, 1356 (Conn. 1994) (upholding the plaintiffs
right to appeal the rejection of its affordable housing applications without first submit
ting a modified proposal); Town Close Assocs. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 679 A.2d
378, 384-85 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (stating that the planning and zoning commission
bears the burden of proof on appeal); Nat'! Associated Props. v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 658 A.2d 114, 121 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that section 8-30g does not
require an affordable housing applicant to obtain approval from all relevant municipal
agencies prior to requesting a zone change); Wisniowski v. Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d
1146,1154-55 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that section 8-30g(c) limits a local commis
sion's discretion, and allows a trial court to grant a zone change if the commission fails
to meet the burden of proof).
10. 735 A.2d 231, 254-55 (Conn. 1999) (finding that the protection of open space
may be a reasonable cause for denying a permit to build affordable housing). See infra
Part V for a detailed discussion of this decision.
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directly with the Appeals ACt. 11
I will begin this Article by exploring briefly the design of sec
tion 8-30g as initially enacted, and comparing it with the already
existing legislative and judicial efforts to promote affordable hous
ing in Massachusetts and New Jersey. Massachusetts' so-called
"anti-snob zoning" act,12 and New Jersey's program deeply rooted
in the Mount Laurel cases,B were well known to us, and were part
of the backdrop against which we developed our own proposal.
Also important were the particular aspects of Connecticut's zoning
law. Then I will discuss the Appeals Act's reception by Connecti
cut's towns, its planning community, and its courts, followed by a
review of the evidence of the effect of the Appeals Act on the crea
tion of affordable housing opportunities during the initial 10 years
after adoption. The third topic I will discuss is the Supreme Court's
decision in Christian Activities Council, Congregational,14 the re
sponse of the second Blue Ribbon Commission to that decision in
its report of February 2000, and the legislature's subsequent amend
ments to the statute. Finally, the Article concludes with some re
flections on the failure of our "free-market" approach to break
down the barriers to affordable housing, why the towns failed to
respond to our invitation to negotiate over the details of affordable
housing proposals, and the now lessened prospects for resolving the
affordable housing problem in Connecticut.
I.

THE DESIGN

OF

SECTION 8-30g

The structure of section 8-30g is relatively simple. 15 It estab
lishes an appeals' procedure with few (albeit very important) differ
ences from the standard administrative appeal process available
when a land use commission denies a garden-variety land use per
mit. 16 The section 8-30g procedure is only available to applicants
who submit an affordable housing application that requires a per
mit or other approval from any municipal agency that exercises
11. BLUE RIBBON COMM'N, STATE OF CONN., FINAL REPORT 9-15 (Feb. 1,2000)
(on file with author) [hereinafter BRC II].
12. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.40B §§ 20-23 (1998).
13. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II]; S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter Mount Laurel I].
14. 735 A.2d at 254-55.
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (1999).
16. Compare the appeals procedure in section 8-30g with the procedures for regu
lar land use permits in sections 8-8 through 8-10.
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zoning or planning authorityP But if any part of,the work involves
an inland wetlands, an inland wetlands permit is required for the
project in addition to zoning and planning approvals, and the wet
lands permit would be issued by a Connecticut Inland Wetlands
Agency, rather than by a zoning and planning commission. 18 An
Inland Wetlands Agency has an effective veto over a project, but
the decisions of an Inland Wetlands Agency are not subject to the
special Appeals Act procedure. 19 The Commission recognized this
limitation on the scope of section 8-30g, but also recognized that
because the proposal would be strongly opposed by the municipali
ties in the legislature, the proposal should not alienate the environ
mental community as well.
An affordable housing application is statutorily defined as re
ferring either to a governmentally assisted housing development for
low- or moderate-income people, or a housing development in
which at least 25% of the dwelling units would be conveyed by
deeds with covenants. 20 The covenants ensured that the units
would be rented or sold at prices deemed to be affordable, defined
as prices not more than 80% of the median sale or rental price in
the "area" or in the state, whichever was less, for at least 30 years
after the initial occupation of the proposed development. 21 In 1995,
the definition of an affordable housing development was modified
so that 25% (up from 20%) of the units had to be affordable in
projects without governmental assistance for at least 30 years (up
from 20 years).22
The force of the special section 8-30g procedure lies in its shift
ing of the burden of proof from the applicant to the planning and
zoning commission. Instead of the applicant having to establish
that the commission acted irregularly and in abuse of its discretion
when it rejected an application for an affordable housing develop
ment, the commission must "prove, based upon the evidence in the
record" that four tests have been satisfied: (1) the decision and the
reasons cited for it must be supported by sufficient evidence in the
record; (2) commission rejection of an affordable housing applica
17. § 8-30g(a), (b).
18. §§ 8-26, 22a-32, 22a-33, 22a-34.
19. § 22a-34.
20. § 8-30g(a)(1)(B).
21. §§ 8-30g(a)(1)(B), 8-39a.
22. 1995 Conn. Acts 280 (Reg. Sess.). See John Rappa, State of Conn. Office of
Legislative Research, Housing Projects Developed Under the Affordable Housing Land
Use Appeals Procedure 2 (July 3, 2000) (on file with author).
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tion must be "necessary to protect substantial public interests in
health, safety or other matters which the commission may legally
consider; [(3)] such public interests clearly outweigh the need for
affordable housing; and [(4)] such public interests cannot be ade
quately protected by reasonable changes to the affordable housing
development. "23 This reverses the normal zoning (and general ad
ministrative law) rule that the public agency goes into litigation
armed with a presumption that it acted rationally and properly, and
the applicant has the burden of establishing otherwise. 24 It was this
shifting of the risk of non-persuasion that drew the ire of many mu
nicipalities and legislators. 25
23. § 8-30g(c). After 1995, projects not receiving governmental monetary support
could not take advantage of the burden-shifting rule if the project was located in an
area zoned exclusively for industrial uses. 1995 Conn. Acts 280 (Reg. Sess.).
24. A modern statement of the presumption is found in United States v. Carolene
Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For a discussion of implications of the
presumption in land use law and of its corrective, a shifting of the burden of proof, see,
e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitution
ality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 7-18 (1992); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (presumption of constitutionality of a
municipal action). Carol Rose suggests that imposing the burden of proof on a local
legislative body, such as section 8-30g does, treats local legislative bodies as inferior
legislatures. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837,852 (1983) (discussing the signifi
cance of burden shifting, as suggested by the decision in Fasano v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 29-30 (Or. 1973) (en banc)). She implies that such a view would
be undesirable, id., and I agree. But the Commission was not taking the view that
municipal legislative bodies are inferior to state agencies; rather, we were simply limit
ing a municipality'S ability to ignore affected groups that are not part of its constituency
but which are affected by its decision - out-of-towners, future residents, and the poor.
We were attempting to control despotic behavior by zoning boards in those contexts,
behavior that victimizes people who cannot have a vote in electing the despots.
25. E.g., Rep. (now Judge) Radcliffe: "[T]his, [then] would be a new rule of law
not applicable to any other state or municipal agency and certainly not consistent with
the Administrative Procedure Act ...." Rep. Tulisano responded, "[A]bsolutely true
...." 32 H.R. Proc., pt. 30, at 10,586 (Conn. May 30, 1989). Rep. Rogg asserted that in
this bill, "we are reversing the whole [zoning] process." Christian Activities Council,
Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231, 257 (Conn. 1999) (Berdon, J., dissent
ing) (quoting 32 H.R. Proc., pt. 30, at 10,666-67 (Conn. May 30, 1989)). Shifting the
burden of proof is not unknown in American or Connecticut law, however unusual it
may be. The burden imposed on the municipality by Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
at 394-95, to establish a nexus between the problem and the measure adopted to resolve
it amounts to a shifting of the burden of proof to the municipality, for example. Simi
larly, so does the "change of circumstances" zoning rule prevalent in some states, which
prohibits a land use agency from changing the rules unless it can establish that circum
stances had changed since the original rule had been adopted. Since 1987, Connecti
cut's Inland Wetlands Act has required a wetlands agency to establish that there is no
feasible or prudent alternative to the applicant's proposal. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a
41(b) (1999). This must be established before it grants a wetlands permit, after holding
a public hearing on the application. TERRY J. TONDRO, CONNECfICUT LAND USE REG
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Towns in which 10% of the housing units qualified as afforda
ble housing were exempted from the burden-shifting rule. This ex
emption was added for administrative reasons. We felt that towns
with that much affordable housing (relatively speaking, of course)
should not have to shoulder the burden of proving that they denied
applications for proper reasons. 26 In keeping with this desire to
minimize administrative demands under the new procedure, afford
able housing was defined to include only subsidized housing, or
housing with deed restrictions limiting its use to low- and moderate
income persons. We recognized that there is a lot of affordable
housing in towns that would not qualify as affordable under this
somewhat artificial definition, but the alternatives seemed adminis
tratively cumbersome or even impossible. For example, a housing
unit that is available at an appropriately low rent level today, or this
year, might not be next year. If such units counted as affordable
housing for the purposes of meeting the 10% exemption from bur
den shifting, a new survey of available housing and prices would
have to be undertaken each year by each of Connecticut's 169
towns or by an agency of the state. The 10% number is considera
bly marked down from the percentage of housing that needs to be
affordable under the income and housing cost limits established by
the legislature. Nevertheless, the 10% exemption concept has
turned out to be a major problem in gaining acceptance of the Ap
peals Act-our concern for simplicity of administration has turned
out to be less of a statutory virtue than simplicity of explanation.
The Act would have fared better if it had not exempted anyone
from the statute under any circumstances.
This is all there is to the affordable housing appeals procedure.
The Appeals Act used some key concepts that are not statutorily
defined, such as "substantial interest" in "health or safety." These
terms are crucial because a commission's rejection must be based
on the protection of such interests. By leaving the terms undefined,
it became the legislature'S, and ultimately the courts', responsibility
to identify in particular contexts which interests were substantial
public interests and which interests involved health and safety. We
ULATION 284 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2000). When civil rights statutes are involved, a
town is required to establish an absence of discriminatory intent once the plaintiff has
established the fact of disparate treatment. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v.
Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per
curiam).
26. BRC II, supra note 11, at 23 (stating the reason for the 10% exemption
provision).
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did propose part ,of a definition for the affected interests by omit
ting the term "welfare" from the usual trilogy of "health, safety and
welfare" because it had become the usual justification for all kinds
of decisions; we considered it too malleable a term. Some of the
interests the courts have since held to be substantial include protec
tion for housing units located in a flood plain27 or on steep slopes,28
and compliance with sedimentation and erosion controls. 29 An ap
plicant's failure to consider the traffic 30 or the environmental im
pacts of its proposal have been upheld as legitimate reasons for
rejecting the application. 31 Other legitimate reasons have included
an inadequate water supply32 or inadequate sewage treatment facil
ities. 33 Commission arguments that would have been upheld in a
normal land use appeal, but which have been rejected in an afforda
ble housing appeal, include a town's argument that approval of an
affordable housing application would result in an adverse impact on
property values or an increase in local school population. 34 Several
reasons given for a denial of an application have been upheld in
some instances and overruled in others. 35 Interests the courts have
27. United Progress, Inc. v. Borough of Stonington Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
No. CV 92-0513392S, 1994 WL 76803, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994).
28. Wisniowski v. Planning Comm'n, 655 A.2d 1146, 1148 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
29. Nizza v. Town of Andover Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 930526193,
1994 WL 421458, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 1994).
30. Mackowski v. Stratford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 96334661, 1998
WL 828109, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1998), rev'd, 757 A.2d 1162 (Conn. 2000)
(finding insufficient evidence to support traffic claim).
31. Indian River Assocs. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 91
0392496S, 1992 WL 108763, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1992).
32. Greene v. Ridgefield Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 8 CONN. L. RPTR. 137
(Super. Ct. 1993).
33. Mackowski, 1998 WL 828109, at *6 (sewer); D'Amato v. Orange Plan & Zon
ing Comm'n, No. CV 92-0506426S, 1993 WL 45042, at *5-6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 3,
1993) (sewage treatment).
34. Barberino Realty & Dev. Corp. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n (Farming
ton), No. CV 930526841 S, 1994 WL 547537, at *10-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 1994);
Shapiro Farm Ltd. P'ship v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (N. Branford), No. CV 92
0517281 S, 1993 WL 452234, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1993) (increase in school
population); Pratt's Corner P'ship v. Southington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No.
CV92 0508877 S, 1993 WL 229752, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 21,1993) (devaluation
and increase in school popUlation). But see Beach v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n
(Milford), 103 A.2d 814,817 (Conn. 1954) (holding that a subdivision application could
not be rejected by the town for the reason that the development would impose "addi
tional financial burdens" on the town, including increased school and road costs).
35. See Town Close Assocs. v. New Canaan Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No.
CV93 0527279 S, 1995 WL 250116, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 1995), affd, 679
A.2d 378 (Conn. App. 1996) (rejecting that adverse impact of traffic generated by the
project was an adequate reason for denial by the commission); United Progress, Inc. v.
Borough of Stonington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 92-0513392S, 1994 WL
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not considered substantial include the development's illegality
under existing zoning regulations (as it would defeat the purpose of
the Appeals Act if it could not prevail over existing zoning rules);36
including inconsistency of the proposal with the town's zoning regu
lations because they required a higher percentage of affordable
housing units than the statute did;37 an asserted need of the town to
study for a 3 year moratorium period the impact of multi-family
units;38 limiting the number of affordable units in the municipal
ity;39 and the need to have affordable housing near community fa
cilities. 40 The courts have proven to be quite fair judges of
pre textual and legitimate reasons, which is perhaps the key to the
gradual acceptance of the initially shocking shift in the burden of
proof.
As noted above, the fourth burden the municipality must carry
is a finding by the commission that the public interests relied on
when it rejected an affordable housing application could not be pro
tected by making reasonable changes in the proposed plan. We had
hoped that this requirement would encourage commissions and de
velopers to find a negotiated plan that both could accept. One ob
stacle is that Connecticut courts have not enforced the requirement
of most land use statutes that a commission must state the reasons
for its decisions. Instead, Connecticut courts have held that if a
commission does not give reasons for its decision or if the reasons it
does give are illegal, the trial court on appeal must search the re
cord to determine if a legitimate reason could be supported by the
76803, at *16-19 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994) (giving unique historical and architec
tural characteristics as one of several proper reasons for denial of application); Nat'l
Associated Props. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV92 0518954 S,
1993 WL 489486, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1993), affd, 658 A.2d 114 (Conn.
1995) (denying application due to architectural standards rejected by the court).
36. W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council, 636 A.2d 1342, 1347
50 (Conn. 1994).
37. Indian River Assocs. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 91
0392496S, 1992 WL 108763, at * 9 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1992). In 1995, the legisla
ture amended the Act to increase the required number of affordable housing units from
20% to 25% of an unsubsidized development. 1995 Conn. Acts 280 (Reg. Sess.).
38. TCR New Canaan, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (Trumbull), No. CV
384353, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXlS 683, at * 64 n.23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1992).
39. Nat'l Associated Props. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 658 A.2d
114, 119 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
40. Greene v. Ridgefield Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 90-04421315,1993
Conn. Super. LEXIS 108, at *24 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1993) (stating that the com
mission based its denial on a distance to community facilities of 1.2 miles, but the court
did not believe the distance outweighed the need for affordable housing).
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evidence in the record. 41
In a situation where the commission can turn down an applica
tion without giving its reasons, or where the only reason given is
protecting the "public welfare," the commission is in a very strong
position if it does not like a project for the most unacceptable of
reasons. Connecticut commissions, knowing that they would not be
penalized for failing to give the reasons for their decision and that
their decision was afforded the presumption of regularity if ap
pealed, had no reason to accommodate a developer whose proposal
they did not like. By requiring the commission to state the reasons
for its decision,42 and by shifting the burden of proof as to the legiti
macy of the reasons for the rejection of an affordable housing
plan,43 the Appeals Act weakened the position of land use commis
sions vis-a-vis applicants. The Appeals Act made it possible for the
town to lose when a case did corne to trial, as opposed to the former
near-certainty that it would win an appeal from its decision. The
first Commission hoped that this shift in relative bargaining
strengths would result in greater cooperation between developers
and commissions, if for no other reason than mutual self-interest.
Better plans would result, and housing that would meliorate the
housing crisis would be completed sooner than if the traditional de
veloper-versus-commission confrontation model continued to be
the practice. 44
The Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington 45
case, at that time recently decided by the Second Circuit, provided
a helpful structure for analyzing land use decisions under the fourth
criterion of the Act. 46 That case divided the reasons for rejecting an
41. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Connecticut
cases which have held so.
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g (c)(I)(A) (1999).
43. § 8-30g(c).
44. In Fiscal Year 1987-1988, resolution of the average zoning case took about 450
days, or 15 months, from the time of filing to the announcement of the decision by the
trial court. BRC I, supra note 4, at A-5. That significant delay counseled a developer
to comply with a commission's decision because the long delay necessary to win an
appeal even if the developer was right was often just too costly. Cf Michael Wheeler,
Negotiating NIMBY's: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11
YALE J. ON REG. 241 (1994) (discussing the Massachusetts siting law involving bargain
ing by developers, and negotiation requirements, and why the statute failed).
45. 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam) (stating
the two prong test from Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148-49 (3d Cir.
1977».
46. § 8-30g(c) (requiring the commission to prove four facts, the fourth of which,
in paragraph D, requires proof that the public interests allegedly being protected by a
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application into site-specific and plan-specific categories. A site
specific reason would be that the slopes on the site were too steep
such that no rearrangement of lot lines could produce buildable
lots. A plan-specific reason would be that many of the slopes were
too steep, but that rearranging the lot lines could produce buildable
lots. Aware of this distinction, the Commission's objective in the
fourth requirement was to prevent the rejection of an application if
there were reasonable changes that could be made in the plan.
One effect of the section 8-30g design was the creation of a
"builders remedy," as developed in New Jersey's Mount Laurel
cases. 47 Connecticut's statute gives any affordable housing appli
cant an appeal right buttressed by the shift in the burden of proof
from that pertaining to normal zoning appeals. We did not create
an administrative agency such as the Fair· Housing Council that
eventually took over the supervision of affordable housing in New
Jersey, nor did we explicitly or implicitly incorporate any "fair
share" or other measurable obligation on any town. We were cer
tain that establishing an administrative agency to determine the af
fordable housing obligation of each town would be politically and
administratively unfeasible. Instead, we relied on the market sense
of the builder as a surrogate for the affordable housing need in a
town; if the builder was willing to proceed with an affordable hous
ing project there was probably a market in that town for that
product.
A positive side of making the builder the affordable housing
"planner" is that we did not need any state agency to make need
determinations. We would also not be drawn into the interminable
arguments like the ones presented before the New Jersey courts
and then before the state agency over which statistics, methodology,
etc., were to be used in deciding an appea1. 48 As a student of af
fordable housing negotiations commented about the Massachusetts
commission's denial of an affordable housing application "cannot be protected by rea
sonable changes to the affordable housing development").
47. Mount Laurel II, at 420 (giving builder's remedies where the plaintiff has ac
ted in good faith and tried to obtain relief without litigation); Mount Laurel I, at 734
(leaving the remedy up to the local municipalities and builders).
48. See Jerome G. Rose, The Mount Laurel II Decision: Is It Based on Wishful
Thinking?, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115, 125 (1983) (describing the New Jersey procedure as
"statistical warfare"); see also Sharon Perlman Krefetz, et aI., Suburban Exclusion in
the 1990s: High Walls, Small Toeholds 10-11 (Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 1990) (unpublished paper
delivered at the 1990 annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association)
(on file with the Western New England Law Review) (describing the New Castle, New
York litigation and its aftermath).
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approach compared with that of New Jersey, "[t]he Massachusetts
approach . . . avoided the difficult question of defining regional
boundaries, overall housing needs, and fair share obligations."49
The Massachusetts approach simply established an administrative
agency within the State's Department of Housing which heard all
affordable housing appeals from adverse local zoning commission
decisions. We tried to emulate the simplicity of the Massachusetts
model.
On the other hand, the downside of relying on the developer to
do affordable housing planning is that the developer's decisions
about where to build will almost always be based simply on market
considerations, such as which land is available, its cost, etc., rather
than on planning considerations such as where it is best to provide
housing for low- and moderate-income families. Of course, non
profit sponsors or developers (who presumably will take a broader
view than a for-profit developer might) can also use the statute, and
have done so. Two of the three Connecticut Supreme Court deci
sions concerning the statute were brought by non-profits. 50
It has been suggested many times that the Appeals Act's spe
cial procedures should be limited to non-profits. There are two
problems with this proposal. One is that non-profits have built a
very small number of affordable housing units during the Appeals
Act's regime. For example, West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc.
involved 10 units, and Christian Activities Council, Congregational
involved 28 housing units. 51 Non-profits usually do not have the
capital or the expertise to build more than a few units at a time.
Moreover, one has to suspect the self-serving nature of this sugges
tion, given that towns have fought efforts by non-profits to build
affordable housing just as hard as they have fought for-profit
developments.
On the other hand, housing of any type is not going to be built
no matter how good the planning has been unless a builder steps
forward to do the building. That person or entity, profit or non
profit, will not step forward unless the project makes good market
49. Michael Wheeler, Regional Consensus on Affordable Housing: Yes in My
Backyard?, 12 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 139 (1993) (This quote is found on page 4 of the
1992 unpublished version, on file with author).
50. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231
(Conn. 1999); W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford),
636 A.2d 1342 (Conn. 1994).
51. The four other appeals considered by the appellate and supreme courts were
brought by for-profit developers and in comparison they proposed building a total of
225 units. See Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 3.
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sense (including available subsidies such as' government grants,
market or below market interest rates, tax credits, etc.). The
builder initiates the affordable housing project, but the planning
and zoning commission can only veto it. By avoiding the establish
ment of needs and quotas, the Blue Ribbon Commission in effect
assumed that the need for affordable housing existed generally
throughout the state, and whoever would satisfy any part of that
need was serving the reasons for the adoption of the Act in the first
place. Conversely, no town was going to be required to provide
affordable housing if there was no need for it because a builder
would not be asking to build there in the first place.
The statute seemed like an elegant solution in a second or
third-best world. The Act permitted towns to continue following
their own home rule preferences except in a limited number of situ
ations involving affordable housing. In those cases the Appeals Act
substituted free market values and concepts for government regula
tion-an approach widely in vogue in the eighties and nineties, and
one presumably favored by the largely conservative towns that en
ded up being most opposed to the Appeals Act. We would like to
have done more for affordable housing, but the political realities as
we saw them precluded this. Unfortunately, time has proven our
fears about the strength of the opposition to affordable housing
well-founded.
II.

PLANNERS' OBJECTIONS TO SECTION 8-30g

Section 8-30g has been a political lightning rod since its adop
tion. Every year efforts have been made to repeal or modify it,
some of which have succeeded. Potentially the most significant
amendment precluded the use of industrially zoned land for afford
able housing which was not governmentally assisted. 52 Other
amendments ratcheted up the number of units that had to be af
fordable in order for the development to qualify for the protection
of section 8-30g from the original 20% to 25%,53 required that a
unit qualifying as affordable remain so for 30 years,54 and required
that a portion of affordable units be available to persons earning no
more than 60% of the lesser of the area's or state's median
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c)(2)(A) (1999).
53. § 8-30g(a)(1)(B).
54. Id. The original legislation did not establish a minimum period of time during
which an eligible unit needed to remain affordable.
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income. 55
Apart from the expected political objections to the Appeals
Act that are based on a misunderstanding of the home rule law in
Connecticut,56 the primary objection to the Appeals Act is that it
gives the applicant an opportunity to force municipalities to accept
land use proposals that violate good planning principles because the
applicant can win an appeal regardless of the merit of its proposal.
Put more trenchantly, an applicant can "blackmail" a town into ac
cepting its development proposal, even if it is not one for affordable
housing, by threatening to withdraw the objectionable application
and resubmit an affordable housing application. The assumptions
behind this allegation are that the affordable housing use of the site
would be more offensive to the town than would be the use pro
posed, and that the town would lose an appeal of its denial of the
affordable housing application.
This is a charge more easily made than verified. The most of
fensive scenario is that just described, where a developer submits a
proposal that the town wants to reject for sound planning reasons.
However, any expressed objection to the proposal by the commis
sion is met by the developer's threat to reapply with an affordable
housing component as a new part of the original proposal. The
town will not be able to deny the "new" proposal because it will
lose a developer's appeal brought under the Appeals Act.
I had student research assistants conduct a survey of town
planners for the thirteen towns in the New Haven regional planning
area to determine how extensive the blackmail was thought to be.
Several planners said this had happened in their town, but only one
planner was able to give particulars. In that case, the planner said
that although the threat was made, the town denied the objection
able application anyway and the developer then disappeared with
out following through on its threat. The town planner for
Wallingford said that no threats had ever been made in her town
because developers always knew they would get a straight deal
from the commission. In addition, I examined the reported section
8-30g decisions between 1990 and 1996, and I could discern a poten
tial for "blackmail" in the facts of only four of the fifty or so cases
55. § 8-30g. Formerly there was no requirement such as this.
56. See generally Simons v. Canty, 488 A.2d 1267, 1270-71 (Conn. 1985) (discuss
ing the home rule law); Timothy S. Hollister, The Myth and Reality of Home Rule Pow
ers in Connecticut, 59 CONN. B.l. 389 (1985) (same); Neil O. Littlefield, Municipal
Home Rule - Connecticut's Mature Approach, 37 CONN. B.l. 390 (1963) (same).
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litigated throughout the state during those six years.57 In two of the
cases it appears that the developer's threat had been followed
through via a resubmitted application that now included an afforda
ble housing component. 58 In a third instance, a bank had been una
ble to sell industrially zoned land it had foreclosed on and applied
for subdivision approval of a project which included an affordable
housing element (this was before the 1995 amendments prohibiting
the use of industrially zoned land for affordable housing). The
town escaped the threat, however, by finding a purchaser who
agreed to establish an industrial use on the site. 59 The fourth in
stance of the use of an affordable housing component to leverage
an objectionable project through a commission occurred in Ston
ington, where an applicant proposed to build, in Stonington's old
historic district, a very upscale "dockominium," which included the
required minimum number of affordable housing units to qualify
for a section 8-30g appeal. The project was widely opposed in town,
and the commission rejected it. The developer appealed under sec
tion 8-30g but lost the appeal because the court found, among other
reasons, that the protection of the town's historic character and
valid health and safety issues warranted the commission's denial of
the application. 60
In the first three of these instances, the offensive use of section
8-30g as a threat could have been avoided by prohibiting, within a
moderately long period of time such as three years, a reapplication
which included a newly added affordable housing component. Such
a statutory amendment would not have prevented a developer's use
of the Appeals Act as a threat, as was attempted in Stonington, so
57. See generally Peter J. Vodola, Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Pro
cedure Law in Practice, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1240-45 (1997). Vodola's article pro
vides an enormous amount of data on the first six years of the Act, including a wealth of
comments by planners, public officials, and developers on the Act's implementation.
Vodola is more sympathetic to the problems of public officials attempting to implement
the Act than I am, and he does not share my concern that the zoning system in Con
necticut is tilted against the developer. Yet while he quotes many officials' and plan
ners' complaints about developer "blackmail," we do agree that there is little actual
evidence of developer abuse of the Act. Id. at 1245-62.
58. See Young v. Tolland Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 950555015, 1997
WL 535252, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 15,1997); Ensign-Bickford v. Simsbury Zon
ing Comm'n, No. CV 940544054S, 1996 WL 737495, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 16,
1996).
59. Dime Sav. Bank v. Durham Planning & Zoning Comm'n, Nos. CV 94
0536676, CV 94-0536677, 1995 WL 548755, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1995); see
Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 2.
60. United Progress, Inc. v. Stonington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. CV 92
05133925, 1994 WL 76803, at *19 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1994).
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that the Appeals Act still could be used for arguably improper pur
poses. But is that true? The Appeals Act was designed to produce
more affordable housing than was being provided by the free mar
ket (defined to include the standard land use controls) but was
never. designed to produce developments that always included a
high percentage of affordable units. The Stonington project would
have produced more affordable housing than otherwise would have
existed in Stonington. If the proposed dockominium otherwise sat
isfied the town's development and zoning plans, the inclusion of
unwanted affordable' housing should not be the basis for rejecting
the proposal.
Another problem with the blackmail scenario is that it seems
to be more apparent than real. If blackmail were as common as
towns often assert, we should not have the surprising result docu
mented in Hollister's study-that three-quarters of the affordable
housing units built pursuant to section 8-30g litigation were built in
projects that were 100% affordable and that these projects consti
tuted one-half of the affordable housing developments approved af
ter litigation. 61 Yet the statute allows a developer to take
advantage of section 8-30g if a mere 20% (now 30%) of the units in
the project are affordable. Assuming affordable housing units have
a lower profit margin than do m<\rket rate units, one would think
that developers .interested in the higher profits assumed by the
blackmail argument would keep the number of affordable housing
units down to the minimum necessary to gain the protection of the
Appeals Act. "Blackmail," in other words, may not be as common
as is usually alleged ..
Nevertheless, some town planners have made overwrought
comments about the Appeals Act's destruction of sound town plan
ning. The town planner for Trumbull, for example, proclaimed that
when an affordable housing application comes in, the town is
obliged to approve it, and "[w]e've lost all control over zoning."62
Another town planner opined that the law elevated affordable
housing over proper land use planning. 63 A third town planner
concluded that the Appeals Act "says that if you want to call it
affordable housing, you can get away with anything you can. "64
61. See Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 3.
62. Vodola, supra note 57, at 1265 (quoting Joan Gruce, the Planning and Zoning
Administrator for the town of Trumbull, Connecticut).
63. Id. (quoting Robert Nerny, the Town Planner in Southington).
64. Id. at 1264 (quoting William Kweder, Planning Consultant for the town of
Suffield).
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These statements reflect a refusal to look at the facts. As of 1995,
the Connecticut courts had upheld municipal. rejections of afforda
ble housing applications in 50% of the cases brought under the Ap
peals Act. 65 More importantly, these planners' criticisms (and
other planners shared their views66 ) strongly suggest a willful mis
reading of the statute as well. The Appeals Act does not prevent a
town from continuing to control the uses of land in the town.
Rather, it merely requires a town to identify sound planning con
cerns as the reasons for rejecting an affordable housing application,
and it precludes rejections for reasons that have no basis in public
health or safety.
Overall, the courts have responsibly sought to separate the spe
cious from real and important municipal interests. By turning the
initiative over to the builder, we did not eliminate consideration of
planning principles or concerns. We merely sought to force towns
to articulate good planning reasons for rejecting an application
which, by its nature, involved social issues of great public
importance.
III.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

ACT

One measure of the impact of section 8~30g is to count the
number of affordable housing units that have been added to the
housing inventory as a result of the adoption of the Appeals Act.
In 1996-1997, Timothy Hollister, an attorney active in affordable
housing development and litigation, organized a group of thirteen
developers and attorneys familiar with affordable housing in Con
necticut. Their objective was to compile a list of affordable housing
units that had been given local land use approval between 1990 and
1996, whether through negotiation with a town or pursuant to a
court decision after section 8-30g litigation. 67 At a minimum, his
65. The 50% number includes cases in which one of the parties prevailed on pro
cedural grounds.
66. See Vodola, supra note 57 (providing reports of his extensive interviews with
Connecticut municipal planners). Vodola's interviews found very few planners who
would openly defend the Appeals Act. I have discussed elsewhere some of the implica
tions of the antipathy to the Appeals Act by many planners. See Terry J. Tondro, Frag
ments of Regionalism: State and Regional Planning at Century's End, 73 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1123, 1140-58 (1999).
67. Rappa, supra note 22, at attachment 3. Hollister has since updated through
1993 the list of decided cases which was part of his 1996 report. TImothy S. Hollister,
Connecticut's Affordable Housing Appeals Statute (Jan. 14, 1999) (unpublished presen
tation to Stamford Regional Bar Association) (on file with author). Hollister was a
member of the Second Blue Ribbon Commission discussed infra Part VI. The author
of this Article was one of the participants in Hollister's group.
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study concluded that 1627 affordable housing units had been built
in that period, 1041 without resort to the Appeals Act or by local
negotiation and settlement, and 586 as a result of litigation. In com
parison, about 57,000 building permits were issued statewide in the
same period. 68 In other words, 3% of the housing units authorized
for construction in the seven year period were affordable housing
units for which section 8-30g was directly responsible.
This does not sound like a lot. By comparison, Massachusetts
claims to have influenced the construction of over 20,000 affordable
housing units over a 30-year period. That is about 5000 units every
7 years, compared to the 1600 units we have developed in a 7-year
period. Connecticut is a smaller state with presumably fewer build
ing permits issued per year than in Massachusetts, which would ex
plain part of the difference between the two states. Moreover, the
7-year period during which the Connecticut Appeals Act has been
in place coincided almost precisely with a significant real estate
market depression in Connecticut, whereas Massachusetts' statistics
include the boom years from 1970-1989. The building downturn be
gan just about the day section 8-30g was enacted and only began to
reverse in 1995.
As Hollister himself observed, one problem with the survey is
that members of the participating group often had difficulty identi
fying a townsperson with knowledge of what was happening in the
town over the 7-year period covered by the survey. Furthermore,
they could not be sure whether a negotiated settlement occurred as
a result of the background pressure exerted by the existence of sec
tion 8-30g or simply sound land use regulation.
Our primary hope for the Appeals Act was not so much that it
would cause homes to be built under court orders, which would be
easier to obtain than zoning approvals from town commissions, but
that it would persuade towns to more fairly appraise proposals for
affordable housing and to negotiate the specifics of the affordable
housing proposal. To evaluate whether this happened, the success
of the statute needs to be measured by other data, beyond simply
tabulating the number of affordable housing units developed as a
result of court order. One of those measures is whether commis
sions in fact dealt more fairly with affordable housing applications
after the statute was adopted. This is quite difficult to measure, of
course, as it requires reviewing the actual proceedings of commis
sion evaluations of affordable housing applications as well as the
68.

See Hollister, supra note 67.
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proceedings involving non-affordable housing applications during
the same period. Hollister's study suggested that about two-thirds
of the affordable housing built in his six year study period resulted
from negotiations rather than litigation. 69 This information has to
be considered very "soft," however, since negotiations on such a
politically sensitive topic as affordable housing are bound to be
kept quiet. Identifying affordable housing units built as a result of
the potential threat of section 8-30g litigation will depend on indi
vidual recollections and beliefs (and probably the interviewees' po
litical agenda).
In my study of the Act's effects in the New Haven regional
planning area during its first 7 years (1990-1996),70 I attempted to
use a more focused methodology, examining the minutes and other
records of the decisions on all land use applications in the region's
15 towns. Three student researchers examined the planning and
zoning commission regulations and files on proposed market rate
and affordable housing developments. Also examined were the
minutes of commission meetings and public hearings on these pro
posals in the 13 towns in the New Haven regional planning region
that were not exempted from the reach of the Appeals Act. Based
on their information, we found that 89 units of affordable housing
had been built or were under construction in the region. However,
a much larger number of affordable housing units, 225, mayor may
not be counted as affordable housing, depending on one's evalua
tion of the details of those projects. In other words, the information
was not particularly helpful. Some of the problems confronted
were that the records varied widely from town to town so that
meaningful inter-town comparisons were impossible; some towns
did not even keep meeting minutes (neither by stenographer nor
even on tape, although required by Connecticut law),71 Therefore,
information on what was said was impossible to obtain and ulti
mately each project, affordable or market-rate, was unique. Those
differentiating factors often can persuasively explain whatever dif
ference in treatment one might be able to identify.
Another measure of the Appeals Act's success might be
gleaned from an analysis of the amendments made by a town to its
zoning regulations to facilitate lower-cost housing opportunities.
Hollister's group identified 51 of Connecticut's 169 towns that dur
69.
70.
71.

See Hollister, supra note 67.
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of "blackmail."
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-7a (1999).
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ing the study period had amended their zoning regulations to im
prove housing afford ability, but his report does not identify the
changes made. Seeking more detail, I had a student ask the re
gional planner at each of the Connecticut Regional Planning Agen
cies about changes in the regulations of the towns in their regions.
He obtained information on 45 towns which had changed their reg
ulations in such a manner that conceivably more affordable housing
could be built. Given that more or less 30 towns are exempt from
the reach of the affordable housing statute in any particular year,
about 139 towns (rather than 169) is the relevant base for this pur
pose. Therefore, we know that just about one-third of the munici
palities subject to section 8-30g appeals did amend their local
zoning regulations. The respondents' information was not always
complete however, and in addition, the question of which regula
tion changes qualify as promoting affordable housing is not clear.
Quite a few changes were made, most of them rather minor, and all
of them subject to the caveat that while changing the regulations is
promising, if no one takes advantage of the change (for whatever
reason) the change might just as well have not been made.
For example, the most common change was to establish an af
fordable housing district or overlay zone in which a housing unit
bonus was provided if affordable housing units were included in the
development. Fifteen of the towns for which we obtained informa
tion adopted a new multi-family zone with the affordable housing
bonus, and others were considering doing so when this survey was
made. This sounds good, but the true value of the change depends
on its context. One town's regulation was subsequently held inap
plicable to a proposed affordable housing project because those
regulations also mandated a higher percentage of affordable hous
ing units than the 20% then required to qualify under section 8-30g.
The court's concern seemed to have been that by requiring more
than 20% of the units to be affordable the town was attempting to
increase the amount of cross-subsidies that had to be provided by
the lowered number of market rate units, thereby making the de
velopment less economically viable.72 The other common change,
72. See Nat'l Associated Props. v. N. Branford Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No.
CV92 0518954 S, 1993 WL 489486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1993), affd, 658 A.2d 114
(1995); Shapiro Farm Ltd. P'ship v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (N. Branford), No. CV
92-0517281 S, 1993 WL 452234 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1993). A cross-subsidy occurs
where the shortfall between the costs of operating a unit and the rents received from a
subsidized (presumably affordable) unit is made up by slightly increasing the rent
charged for an unsubsidized unit in the same development to a level above that which
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adopted by 9 of the 45 towns, was to allow accessory apartments.
While an accessory apartment is undoubtedly more affordable than
a single-family home, so that general progress toward reducing
housing costs was made by these towns, the rent for an accessory
apartment is, nonetheless, not necessarily within the affordable
housing price range. Another cautious change in 2 towns was to
provide a density bonus for elderly housing units, if the elderly units
were affordable.
Many changes authorized a waiver of certain zoning regula
tions if the proposed development included affordable housing,
such as the waiver of a zoning requirement that non-conforming
lots must be merged; waiver of front footage rules to permit the
creation of flag lots (which allow the owner of a large lot to subdi
vide off the rear portion of the lot even though sufficient lot front
age for two lots on a street would not then exist; access to the rear
lot is provided by a long driveway-the flagpole); waiver of ground
floor residential use requirements; waiver of maximum lot coverage
standards; and the waiver of minimum floor area requirements to
allow building of "starter homes." One central city negotiated
agreements with its suburbs whereby a suburb undertook to "work
with" its landlords to gain their acceptance of section 8 certificate
holders. Another town created a trust fund to make affordable
housing grants to eligible persons and to build affordable housing
projects, and yet another town approved owner-occupied duplexes
if one of the units was affordable.
IV.

THE CAPITOL REGION's HOUSING COMPACT ApPROACH

In the same year as the first Commission was appointed, the
Connecticut legislature created an alternate mechanism for encour
aging the development of affordable housing. The legislation
funded a pilot program in the Hartford Regional Planning area to
see if, with the help of a professional negotiator, the participating
towns could agree on a strategy for increasing the low-income hous
would be required to pay for that unit's costs. See generally ALAN MALLACH, INCLU
SIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1984).
Compare a subsequent superior court holding that a town could not limit the num
ber of affordable housing units to 50% of the development because the need for afford
able housing outweighed the commission's reasons for limiting the number of
affordable housing units. Simply from a planning perspective, I would think that limit
ing the percentage of affordable housing in a development is a good thing to do in order
to prevent the creation of affordable housing "ghettoes." Griswold Hills Newington
Ltd. P'ship v. Newington Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 16 Conn. L. Rptr. 45, 48-49
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
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ing supply in the region.7 3 A 5 year Capitol Region Fair Housing
Compact on Affordable Housing ("Compact") was adopted by 25
of the 29 towns in the region, effective on May 23, 1990.
The Compact established a goal of creating between 4583 and
5637 new affordable housing opportunities in the region over the
five years of the plan. Housing opportunities included the construc
tion of new housing units, but also included new initiatives to facili
tate the creation of more affordable housing opportunities such as
the preparation of an affordable housing strategy. The 5 year sum
mary report for the Compact, for example, gave the town of Glas
tonbury credit for 3 initiatives; (1) adopting new zoning regulations
to allow accessory apartments; (2) establishing a Housing Partner
ship (a program designed to partner the state with the town to find
resources for affordable housing, a recommendation of the first
Commission); and (3) establishing an Affordable Housing Land
Trust. 74 Glastonbury's strategy for meeting its Compact goal was to
permit the production of moderately-priced units through its ex
isting Planned Area Development regulations, "and to pursue other
initiatives as appropriate." In terms of new housing unit construc
tion, Glastonbury received credit for adding 45 elderly affordable
units and 48 family affordable units, for a total of 93 new units as of
September 1995.75 Glastonbury fell into the group of 5 towns that
had achieved between 50% and 74% of minimum Compact goals
while 16 towns achieved more than had this group. Five municipali
ties participating in the Compact achieved less. 76
At the end of the 5 year Compact, the towns assessed their
next step, and voted to replace the Compact's techniques of specific
goals with a Regional Housing Policy which was also to remain in
effect for a 5 year period. The major difference between the Com
pact goal-type structure, and the Housing Policy structure, is how
non-directive the Policy is. Of 11 strategies for accomplishing its
goal of increasing "the range of choice in housing," only 1 discusses
a land use policy for each town that will "allow for a diversity of
housing types and costs in all communities. "77 The other ten strate
gies speak about transportation, job creation, use of federal and
73. 1988 Conn. Acts 334 (Reg. Sess.).
74. Capitol Region Fair Housing Compact Annual Report 23-24 (Sept. 1995) (un
published report) (on file with author) [hereinafter Capitol Report].
75. /d. at app. A-3 to A-5.
76. Id. at 4-5.
77. Capitol Region Council of Governments Regional Housing Policy Executive
Summary 2 (Jan. 28, 1998) (unpublished report) (on file with author).
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state housing subsidies, helping families move from subsidized
housing to non-subsidized housing, etc,78 Nothing, in other words,
looks remotely like a call to towns to drop their existing barriers to
newcomers from out of town. This is a Home Rule document.
But the Christian Activities Council, Congregational decision,
discussed in the next section, found that Glastonbury's participation
in the Compact was a positive action indicating that the town was
not closed. Glastonbury had nearly met its compact quota for the
creation of additional affordable housing units in the town despite
its denial of the application at issue in that case.
V.

THE CHRISTIAN ACTIVITIES DECISION

The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld section 8-30g in the
first two appeals it heard under the Act. In West Hartford Interfaith
Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), the court held the
Act applied to any affordable housing decision by a zoning author
ity, despite an ambiguity in the statute about whether a rejection of
an application for a zone change (as opposed to a more limited de
cision on the approval of a particular development project) could
be appealed and the burden shifted to the town to justify its deci
sion. 79 To decide otherwise, the court held, would give a town an
easy way of avoiding the statute, by zoning all land so that a zone
change would be required before sUbmitting an individual site ap
plication. A second important holding was that a zoning commis
sion can impose and enforce conditions on all types of development
approvals, clarifying a confused area of Connecticut law. 8o
In Kaufman, decided the next year, the court again sustained
an appeal by an applicant because the reason given by the Town of
Danbury for rejecting an application (a town water supply might
become polluted) was contradicted by evidence produced before
the commission by the town's own engineer. 81 The court held that
the "sufficient evidence" standard required by the statute was not
as demanding as the usual "substantial evidence" required to sup
port an administrative decision on an application concerning a spe
cific site. Nonetheless, it required more than a "possibility" that the
feared result would occur. Kaufman relied on legislative history for
Id. at 1-3.
79. w. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 636
A.2d 1342, 1354-55 (Conn. 1994).
80. Id. at 1355.
81. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n (Danbury), 635 A.2d 798, 819 (Conn. 1995).
78.
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this conclusion. The House Manager for the legislation had ob
served that "sufficient evioence" would require "something on the
record that third parties can look at in an objective manner and
reach the same conclusion."82 Kaufman also spoke to the condi
tioning power of zoning commissions when the court dismissed
Danbury's complaint that it had no means of enforcing resale and
other restrictions on affordable housing parcels. Kaufman reiter
ated the rule established in West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc.,
that commissions can condition zoning approvals and specifically
held that a commission can even place enforceable conditions on
zone change approvals. 83
However, in its third Appeals Act decision, in 1999, Christian
Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury),
the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected a developer's appeal from
the denial by the Glastonbury Town Council of a zone change ap
plication. 84 The application would allow the construction of 26 sin
gle-family affordable houses on a 33-acre parcel owned by the
Metropolitan District Commission ("MDC"), a regional water au
thority in the Hartford area. The MDC also owned 546 acres of
land directly across a street from the 33-acre site. All of the MDC's
land was zoned as "reserved land," meaning that no residential de
velopment was allowed. 85 The applicant had applied for a zone
change for the smaller site to enable construction of the affordable
housing "for low.and moderate income minority families."86 The
Glastonbury Town Council exercises zoning powers in Glastonbury,
but only after receiving the recommendation of the Town Planning
and Zoning Commission. In Christian Activities Council, Congrega
tional, the Commission had recommended approval of the
application. 87
The Town Council gave several reasons for its denial of the
application, including that a dangerous traffic intersection existed
on the road bisecting the two MDC parcels; the 1994 Plan of Devel
opment had recommended that the town consider purchasing the
MDC lands for open space; and its concern that the construction
82. Remarks of Representative Tulisano at the House Proceedings on May 30,
1989, in response to question by an opponent of the proposed legislation. Http://
www.cga.state.ct.us/textsearch/sessiontranscripts.
83. Kaufman, 653 A.2d at 811-12. See generally TONDRO, supra note 25, at 463.
84. 735 A.2d 231, 236 (Conn. 1999). This author co-authored an amicus brief in
this case, urging a reversal of the trial court's decision.
85. Id. at 236.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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would endanger a potential future water supply source. 88 The trial
court held that Glastonbury had carried its burden of proof on the
third reason (endangering the public water supply),89 but the Con
necticut Supreme Court concluded that the town's open space pro
tection defense was stronger. 90 Neither court discussed the two
reasons each court did not consider, following the traditional Con
necticut zoning rule that a town's decision must be upheld even if
only one of the reasons for the decision is supported by evidence in
the record. 91
The positive aspect of the decision in Christian Activities Coun
cil, Congregational is its clear support for the Blue Ribbon Com
mission's effort to effectively require a zoning commission to
provide an affordable housing applicant with the reasons for the
commission's rejection. Despite a statutory requirement that most
land use regulatory agencies, including planning and zoning com
missions, state the reasons for their decisions, the Connecticut
courts have consistently refused to penalize a commission for failing
to do SO.92 If a commission fails to provide the reasons for its deci
sion, the trial and appellate courts are obliged to search the record
to determine if any basis exists for upholding the commission. Even
if every reason the commission gives for its decision is illegal, the
courts must still search the record, and if they find a proper reason
the decision must be upheld. 93 This misreading of the statute com
pounds the difficult task of an applicant (or neighbor) seeking to
reverse a municipal decision, since the appellant cannot know the
grounds on which the decision might be attacked, and the courts
themselves have difficulty in reviewing commission decisions-es
88.
89.

Id. at 237.
Id.
90. Id. at 248-53.
91. See TONDRo, supra note 25, at 406 n.65.
92. See id., at 474-75, n.295 for citations to the statutes requiring a statement of
reasons when reviewing zone changes, historic district commission denials, variances,
special permits, appeals from decisions by the zoning enforcement officer, waivers of
subdivision regulations, applications for approval of subdivisions and re-subdivisions,
and of coastal site plans.
93. Stankiewicz v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals (Montville), 556 A.2d 1024 (Conn.
1989) (per curiam), affg 546 A.2d 919, 920-21 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (establishing the
most extreme form of the no-reasons rule); see also, e.g., Protect HamdenlN. Haven
From Excessive Traffic and Pollution, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (Hamden),
600 A.2d 757, 766-68 (Conn. 1991); Caserta v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals (Milford), 610
A.2d 713, 715-16 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), appeal decided on other grounds, 626 A.2d 744
(Conn. 1993). The extent of a court's obligation is a bit muddled, however, after West
Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., which reiterated the pre-Stankiewicz rule and pro
vided citations to cases with conflicting holdings. See TONDRo, supra note 25, at 475.
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pecially in the politically and emotionally charged area of exclu
sionary zoning. 94 The court in Christian Activities Council,
Congregational explicitly found that the Act required the commis
sion "to state its reasons on the record when it denies an affordable
housing land use application ... because it will help guard against
possibly pretextual denials of such applications. "95 But beyond the
statement-of-reasons holding, Christian Activities Council, Congre
gational contains one narrow and cramped decision after another
against the purpose of the Appeals Act, even though the Court had
held that the Appeals Act was a remedial act to be liberally con
strued to "facilitate the much needed development of affordable
housing throughout the state. "96
On the other hand, an even more important holding of the case
limited the area for the determination of the need (or demand) for
affordable housing to the town in which the site is located. The
court relied on the legislative history of the statute and the floor
debates to reach this conclusion. The Blue Ribbon Commission had
suggested that affordable housing needs be measured by the hous
ing need of the region as determined by the state's regional plan
ning agencies,97 or by such other method as established by the
Office of Policy and Management. 98 Statutory precedent for a re
gional approach to calculating housing needs already required
towns, when adopting zoning regulations, to "encourage the devel
opment of housing opportunities ... for all residents of the munici
pality and the planning region in which the municipality is
located. "99 Furthermore, Connecticut General Statutes section 8
94. Connecticut courts have recognized the problem even in cases not involving
exclusionary zoning allegations. See, e.g., Parks v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n (South
ington), 425 A.2d 100, 103 (Conn. 1979); Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. Zoning Bd.
(Trumbull), 549 A.2d 1076, 1084 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988). See generally Carol M. Rose,
Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71
CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983) (providing a thoughtful discussion of jurisprudential reasons
why an administrative agency should provide reasons for its decisions).
95. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury),
735 A.2d 231, 239 (Conn. 1999).
96. Id. at 239 (quoting Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n (Danbury), 653 A.2d 798, 809
(Conn. 1995)); W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford),
636 A.2d 1342, 1349 (Conn. 1994).
97. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-31a to 8-37b (1999) (establishing the procedure
through which local regional planning agencies are formed). The State's Office of Pol
icy and Management has established fifteen municipal planning regions. Towns may
elect to participate in the activities of the Regional Planning Agencies and nearly all
have done so.
98. BRC I, supra note 4, at A-7.
99. § 8-2 (emphasis added) (Connecticut's zoning delegation statute).
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39a already defined affordable housing as housing for people whose
income is equal to or less than the "area median income for the
municipality in which such housing is located." Hence the Blue
Ribbon Commission's bill as submitted to the legislature had re
quired a consideration of "the need for affordable housing in the
region." However, the legislature omitted the italicized language
from the bill in the process of adopting the legislation. loo The court
noted that in an exchange between one of the bill's sponsors and
one of its opponents, the sponsor was asked if dropping the regional
language was the same as substituting a reference to "the town in
question," to which he responded "I think that is generally the
intent."101
Both West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. and Kaufman had
put off deciding the town/regional issue. In Kaufman the court
avoided the issue by pointing out that its decision-that the town's
reasons for rejecting the application were not supported by the evi
dence-meant that the town's rejection could not be upheld regard
less of whether need was measured in the town or in the region. 102
In West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., the court avoided the
issue by observing that much less than 10% of West Hartford's
housing supply was affordable, so that defining the need for afford
able housing by looking only at West Hartford's housing supply
would not help the defendant town in any event.1°3 Moreover, the
court held that "a local focus could severely undermine the devel
opment of low income housing because wealthy towns could claim
that they have few low income residents, and consequently have
little or no local need for low income housing."104 This would be a
particularly effective method for avoiding the application of section
8-30g, given the intensity of the economic segregation of housing
patterns in Connecticut. lOS
This holding in West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. had im
100. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 249.
101. !d. at 249-50 (citing Substitute House Bill 7270).
102. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n, 635 A.2d 798, 819 (Conn. 1995).
103. W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 636
A.2d 1342, 1354 n.23 (Conn. 1994). West Hartford's percentage of affordable housing
stock was 6% of its total housing stock, a little more than Glastonbury'S at the time the
Christian Activities Council Congregational filed the application.
104. Id.
105. See RUSK, CmEs WITHOUT SUBURBS 114 (1995) (concluding that Connecti
cut is the most economically segregated state in the United States, and the ninth most
racially segregated state; Hartford, New Haven and Bridgeport, Connecticut's largest
cities, are among the 21 poorest cities in the country).
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plicitly set the court on the path of viewing any shortfall from the
10% rule as establishing a need for affordable housing in that town.
Since Glastonbury'S number of affordable housing units fell sub
stantially below the 10% level, it was no more necessary for the
court to decide the town-regional issue in Christian Activities Coun
cil, Congregational than it had been in the prior two cases. None
theless the court did decide the regional-local issue "because in the
present case the defendant specifically phrased its reasons for deny
ing the plaintiff's application in terms of 'the availability of other
parcels in town suitable· for affordable housing.' "106 But no evi
dence was presented that such sites even existed in Glastonbury.
The record showed that the members of the Town Council "had
relied on their knowledge that there were other sites in town that
were suitable for affordable housing," yet there is no indication in
either the trial court or Supreme Court opinions that the courts
knew where these phantom sites were or whether they were in fact
available for sale to an affordable housing developer. 107 This un
critical acceptance of the Town Council's unsupported assertion
that other sites existed is contrary to holdings in and outside Con
necticut in affordable housing cases that reject such unsupported
claims.
A variation on the "other available sites" claim was made by
the township in Mount Laurel IIlO8 for example. In that case the
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the township's claim that other
newly re-zoned land was available for affordable housing, noting
that the township knew that the owners of the three parcels of land
involved did not want to sell, that the sites were surrounded by in
dustrial uses, and that parts or all of the three sites were described
as swampy land. 109 The Second Circuit in Huntington Branch,
106. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 249.
107. Id. at 254. In Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the Sec
ond Circuit emphasized that the town's identical defense ("other sites are available")
was flawed because 63 of the 64 alleged sites were in fact unavailable because they were
under-developed properties - i.e., they required clearing of the site in order to build the
proposed housing project - and the 64th site had been declared unsuitable by HUD.
844 F.2d 926, 941 (2d Cir. 1988). In other words, the proposed alternate sites were
identified and their zoning, development status, and appropriateness for affordable
housing could be and were evaluated by the reviewing federal court. !d. That was not
possible in Glastonbury, because the sites were never identified. Christian Activities
Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 236-37.
108. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
109. !d. at 460-62. After its loss in Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, the township
had zoned three areas for higher density housing. Id. at 460. The plaintiffs in Mount
Laurel II successfully contested the town's responses on several grounds, including the
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NAACP v. Town of Huntington also refused to accept the town's
argument that two alternate sites were available for the applicant's
project because the town could not establish that the sites were in
fact available to the affordable housing applicant. 110 The lack of
control over the sites meant that the town had not satisfied its obli
gation to refute the prima facie case of discrimination that the ap
plicant had made. lll The Connecticut Supreme Court itself had
declined to accept the town's claim in West Hartford Interfaith Coa
lition, Inc. that other sites existed in town, in the absence of evi
dence that those "other sites" met the statutory criteria of
affordable housing. 1l2 By now accepting the "other available sites"
claim, particularly without requiring proof that such sites exist and
are available, the court has presented towns with the perfect means
for avoiding the force of section 8-30g: commission members simply
have to assert that other (unspecified) sites are available, and that is
the end of the appeal.
The explanation for this odd result might be the Connecticut
rule in land use cases that commission members are entitled to rely
on their personal knowledge of the town and its situation when
making a decision, unless the matter is one for which expert knowl
edge is necessary (a pollution question, for instance) and in which
expert testimony has been presented to support one side and not
the other. ll3 After noting the Commission members' assertions
about other sites, the court adds: "[m]oreover, the plaintiff makes
no claim that there [were] no other sites in the town that are suita
ble for affordable housing development."114
The court thus subtly shifts back to the applicant the burden of
proof (to support the "no other sites" claim that is now required)
on the flimsiest of showings by the municipality: unsupported and
unsworn claims by the defendant about the need for affordable
housing in the town. In other words, the court has held that these
phantom claims are sufficient to carry the town's burden of proof,
or, the burden of proof has never really shifted despite the statute.
Connecticut's judge-made rule allowing commissioners to rely on
failure of the municipality to demonstrate that the re-zoned sites in fact were available.
Id. at 460-62.
110. 844 F.2d at 941.
111. Id. at 938.
112. W. Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. v. Town Council (West Hartford), 636
A.2d 1342, 1352-53.
113. Id. at 1352.
114. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury),
735 A.2d, 231, 254.
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their own knowledge unless an expert testifies to the contrary on a
subject requiring expert opinion is good common sense ordinarily.
But when its result, as here, is to severely weaken if not actually
nUllify the primary technique adopted in a remedial statute, it
seems the court should prefer the legislature's remedial course
rather than blindly following the judge-made rule. The court had
done just that in West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc., when it
rejected the argument based on traditional zoning analysis that a
zone change denial was not covered by the Act.lls West Hartford
Interfaith Coalition, Inc. held that such a holding would destroy the
remedial purpose of the statute by making it very easy to avoid, and
accordingly declined to adopt that reasoning. 116 Christian Activities
Council, Congregational has now ensured that no affordable hous
ing will be built in town unless the town wants it. That was the law
in 1988 before section 8-30g was adopted as remedial legislation.
Christian Activities Council, Congregational further under
mined the court's earlier decisions on affordable housing need
when it failed to explain why Glastonbury's less than 6% affordable
housing stock percentage did not bear on that problem. 117 Glaston
bury has not had a stellar record of concern for providing afforda
ble housing. In 1994, at the time the application was filed in
Christian Activities Council, Congregational, only 5.48% of Glas
tonbury'S housing stock was reported to be affordable. II8 Glaston
bury was making progress toward the so-called 10% goal and
continued to do so down to the release of the Christian Activities
Council, Congregational decision, but the point under the West
Hartford Interfaith Coalition, Inc. and Kaufman cases was not
whether Glastonbury was making progress, but, rather, whether it
had reached the goal. 119 It had not.
115. 636 A.2d at 1348-49.
116. Id. The traditional view had been adopted by an unappealed Superior Court
case.. Lantos v. Newtown Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No. 306607, 1992 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 651, at *6-9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1992).
117. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 254.
118. State of Conn., Dep't of Hous., Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure (un
published, Apr. 12, 1994). At the time the Connecticut Supreme Court released its
opinion in Christian Activities Council, Congregational, Glastonbury's affordable hous
ing stock was still only 6.79% of its total housing stock. State of Conn., Dep't of Econ.
and Cmty. Dev., Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure (1998 files), at http://
www.state.ct.us/ecdlHousinglappeals.htm (last updated Oct. 30, 2000). The first De
partment of Housing Report, July 9,1990, reported that 5.3% of Glastonbury's housing
stock was affordable.
119. At the time of its losing appeal, for example, Danbury's percentage of af
fordable housing stock was 9.8%. The trial court rejected Danbury's argument that it
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Instead of focusing on Glastonbury's shortfall from the 10%
established in the Act, the court focused on Glastonbury's satisfac
tion of its obligations under the Capitol Region Housing Compact.
It concluded that in 1993, a year before the plaintiffs applied for the
zone change, Glastonbury had "met" 55% of its goal, "or 122 of its
Compact goal of 220 affordable housing units."120 It is not clear
where the court found these figures. The 1995 Annual Report of
the Capitol Region's Fair Housing Compact stated that as of 1995
Glastonbury had completed only 93 affordable housing units 121
but this was as of two years after the larger 1993 figures cited in
Christian Activities Council, Congregational. The 93 units credited
by the Compact's 1995 report are roughly consistent with the num
bers cited in the Department of Housing's "10% list." Glaston
bury's affordable housing supply in 1989 constituted 5.3% of its
total housing supply and by 1994, that percentage had increased
only to 5.48%, or, in absolute numbers, from 588 affordable hous
ing units in 1989 to 650 affordable housing units at the end of 1994.
There is a lot of uncertainty in the numbers, though, and the "dis
crepancy," if there is one, would be unimportant but for the empha
sis that the court places on Glastonbury's record of achievement
under the terms of the Compact.
By giving credit to Glastonbury's "good efforts" under the
Compact, the court rewrote the statute to include a newly discov
ered incentive for towns that are trying. Towns have correctly com
plained that the only incentive (and a useless one at that) for towns
to provide affordable housing was that even if a town made good
faith efforts to satisfy a Compact objective it was protected from
further section 8-30g appeals only for one year. Nonetheless, the
statute does recognize that Housing Compacts existed but gave
them only a limited ability to insulate the town from section 8-30g.
Why does the court "correct" that statutory omission?
As viewed by the court, then, the supply of affordable housing
in Glastonbury is adequate, regardless of whether the statute's defi
nitions are met. Instead, Christian Activities Council, Congrega
tional relied on Glastonbury's activity under the Capitol Region
Affordable Housing Compact as a measure of Glastonbury's efforts
was only .2% short of having 10% of its housing stock credited as affordable and there
fore should be considered exempt from the special appeals procedure for section 8-30g
cases. Kaufman v. Zoning Comm'n, No. CV92 0507929S, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2039, at *25-29 (Aug. 13, 1993).
120. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 254.
121. Capitol Report, supra note 74, at app. A-5.
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to provide affordable housing rather than on its record as required
under the Act. 122 The court also observed that the town adopted a
regulation allowing a density bonus for affordable housing within
planned area development zones, although the court does not say
whether that provision had ever been used,123 and noted that Glas
tonbury had recently approved ten additional units of affordable
housing.124 But the court failed to notice that Glastonbury on at
least one occasion had gone out of its way to stop the building of
affordable housing. In that instance, Glastonbury cited numerous
reasons why it denied the application, including an over-concentra
tion of affordable housing in the town center and loss of productive
farm land. Nonetheless, the town lost. So serious was the town's
intent to prevent affordable housing, that it responded by buying
the land itself.
That the town has an adequate supply of affordable housing is
only one defense to a claim that it has violated the requirements of
Section 8-30g. A second defense is that even though the demand
for affordable housing is great, satisfaction of that need does not
require the town to sacrifice other substantial public interests. The
statute requires that the need for affordable housing be measured
against any substantial public interest that would be threatened if
the affordable housing proposal were approved. Protecting open
space is clearly a substantial public interest, but the court does not
clearly identify the open space it believed must be preserved. In
Christian Activities Council, Congregational, out of a total MDC
acreage of 579 contiguous acres, the affordable housing develop
ment in question would use only 20 acres, leaving 559 acres of open
space after development of the site. 125 That this is inadequate open
space is a bit preposterous, of course, but the court concludes that it
is inadequate because the court chose to focus on the 33-acre por
tion of the MDC site on one side of the road bisecting the MDC
lands and ignored the contiguous 500+ acres on the other side of
the road. 126 The final sentence of the majority opinion insisted on
viewing the 33-acre site as an island unto itself: "There was suffi
122. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 254.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 735 A.2d 231. The specific site was 33 acres; the balance of the MDC-owned
land, across the road from the site, was 546 acres, for a total of 579 acres of adjacent
open space. The development would have used a cluster form, requiring only 20 acres
of the 33 acres on the site, with the balance of 13 acres being dedicated as open space.
Id. at 255.
126. Id.
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cient evidence in the record for the defendant to have concluded
that a 33.42 acre, twenty-eight unit residential subdivision, bisected
by thirteen acres of open space, simply is not the same thing as
33.42 acres of open space."127 Yet three pages earlier in the opin
ion, the court held that all the MDC lands had to be considered as
one entity "for purposes of open space and conservation. "128
The relationship between the need for affordable housing and
the protection of substantial public interests is the key to section 8
30g and to providing for affordable housing in general. As noted
above, the planners primarily objected to what they viewed as sec
tion 8-30g's unwarranted authority to override what they consid
ered to be proper planning decisions in favor of affordable housing
objectives. But such a conflict is inevitable when the pursuit of 2
desirable policy objectives produces conflicting results in specific
contexts. A specific piece of land such as that in Glastonbury can
not be used for both passive and active recreation, or for preserving
historic structures in an historic district and the opening up of a new
road. Nor can a 33-acre piece of land in Glastonbury be used both
as open space and as a site for housing (for any income level). One
of planning's objectives is to work out the conflicts between com
peting choices for the allocation of scarce resources such as land.
The choice made will be the product of criteria and priorities estab
lished by statute and regulations, and by the decision-maker's judg
ment about the application of those criteria and priorities in the
particular context. But when the planning exercise is not thought to
take adequate account of one of the competing policies, its propo
nents have the option of looking for a political solution, as hap
pened in 1969 in Connecticut when the legislature authorized the
creation of inland wetlands agencies to protect wetlands from de
struction. 129 Environmentalists were concerned that local planning
and zoning commissions were not adequately protecting wetlands
from over-development although they had the authority to do so.
As with section 8-30g, the legislature responded by taking the
power to balance the competing policy interests out of the hands of
planning and zoning commissions and gave it to the new inland wet
lands agencies. 130
Section 8-30g does provide some criteria for deciding between
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
!d. at 253.
CONN. GEN. STAT.

§§ 22a-42 to -45d.

§§ 22a-36 to -45d (1999).
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using a parcel for affordable housing, and using it to preserve a con
flicting policy objective. 131 A denial of an affordable housing appli
cation must be "necessary" in order to protect a substantial public
interest;132 even so, the need to protect that substantial public inter
est must "clearly outweigh" the "need" for affordable housing if the
denial is to be upheld.13 3 In order to sustain a town denial of an
affordable housing application, then, this formula requires first, that
the public interest be "substantial;"134 second, that it cannot be pro
tected if the affordable housing application is granted;135 and third,
that the affordable housing "need" is "clearly outweighed" by the
necessity of protecting the identified public interest. 136
Protecting open space is clearly a substantial public interest,
but the other two legs of the test do not seem satisfied in the Glas
tonbury situation, contrary to the court's conclusion. While implic
itly a balance is to be struck between the town's need for affordable
housing and the protection of open space, that balance has been
heavily weighted by the legislature in favor of affordable housing.
The Appeals Act does not require a simple balancing of the need
for affordable housing against the protection of sound planning
concerns affecting public health and safety. Rather, it requires sat
isfaction of the affordable housing need unless the necessity for
protecting open space clearly outweighs137 the need for the afforda
ble housing. A simple balancing of equal interests was not estab
lished by the Appeals Act; rather, the legislation places a heavy
thumb on the scale in favor of affordable housing. The public inter
est is insufficient even if it outweighs the need for affordable hous
ing; open space must "clearly outweigh" the affordable housing
need. An affordable housing application may be rejected only if
"necessary"-not simply reasonably necessary-to protect the pub
lic interest. But unlike the court's close reading of the statutory
language on other issues,138 the court chose not to emphasize these
131. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c).
132. § 8-30g(c)(1)(B).
133. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C).
134. § 8-30g(c)(1)(B).
135. § 8-30g(c)(1)(D).
136. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C).
137. Id.
138. For example, the court placed great emphasis on the fact that the legislature
had dropped the word "regional" as a qualifier when it described the "need" for afford
able housing. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
legislative history of the word "region" in the statute.
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very high demands imposed on the town by the statute. 139
Applying the statutory balancing criteria, the question is did
the preservation of 20 acres of land out of a total of 579 acres of
open space clearly outweigh the affordable housing need in a con
tiguous suburb of the second poorest city in the state, a suburb
which has barely satisfied half of the legislative "goal" for afforda
ble housing units? The court responded by characterizing the lost
open space as the public interest that is threatened by transferring
100% of the 33 acres to the plaintiff. This ignores, however, the
more than 500 acres that were part of the original parcel, and which
will continue to be preserved as open space. It also ignores the fact
that even if the 33-acre parcel is viewed as an island unto itself
more than 50% of that parcel would remain as open space because
of the proposed cluster pattern of development. Open space at this
site is thus rnischaracterized as a highly threatened resource.
On the other side of the balance, the court's opinion eliminates
any need for affordable housing in Glastonbury. It ignores (by im
plicitly overruling) its earlier decisions in West Hartford Interfaith
Coalition, Inc. and Kaufman on the circumstances when town or
regional need is important and must be considered. It ignores its
own conclusions in those cases and in Christian Activities Council,
Congregational that the statute is to be interpreted to give it reme
dial effect. It ignores Glastonbury's failure to comply with the 10%
"goal" of section 8-30g. And finally, it "amends" the Appeals Act
to protect a town from an affordable housing lawsuit because the
town is complying with Compact requirements which section 8-30g
itself rejects as irrelevant.
Early in its opinion the court extensively discussed the mean
ing of the "sufficient evidence" required by section 8-30g(c)(1)(A)
if the town is to carry its newly imposed burden of proof. But this
discussion seems of little consequence for the outcome of the case,
as is evident upon examination of the evidence relied on by the
court. The court accepted as sufficient evidence testimony that the
town had been considering for over 25 years the purchase of the site
in question for open space but had never gotten around to doing
SO.140 Yet as stated in the court's opinion, it was only after the town
139. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council (Glastonbury),
735 A.2d 231, 244, 254 n.29.
140. In 1971, the town unsuccessfully offered to purchase from MDC the 33-acre
site in question. A year later, a town committee recommended that the town buy either
the entire MDC land, or at least the 33-acre site. Nothing happened, evidently, as the
Town Manager recommended in 1977 that the town purchase the 33 acre site, and again
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received the affordable housing application of the developer to de
velop 20 acres of the MDC land for affordable housing that the
defendant Town Council ordered the commencement of the contin
gency planning called for in the 10 year old 1984 Plan of
Development. 141
The court examined this strangely coincidental timing of the
town finally deciding to do something about the 25 year old unsatis
fied recommendations of town officials, and the submission of the
plaintiff's plans to build affordable housing on a small part of the
tract. The Court concluded that:
the defendant [Town Council] had before it a record replete with
evidence that, consistently for nearly twenty-five years, beginning
at the latest in April, 1971, and continuing to March, 1994, just a
few months before the defendant's hearing in this case, the town
had viewed the parcel in question, along with the rest of Metro
politan [MDC] land, as particularly appropriate for open space
... [and] that this was much more than an idle or passing thought
for the town, which had planned for and on several occasions
attempted to purchase the particular parcel in question for these
purposes; or encouraged the state to do so as part of a regional
plan.1 42

The "several occasions" in fact total one instance of an offer to
purchase, and one other instance when the town sought to persuade
the state to purchase the land.
Municipal decisions to purchase land are not lightly made, of
course, so the town's delay in getting around to even studying how
to acquire all or part of the MDC land is not surprising. What is
bothersome, however, is that the town finally decided to act imme
nothing was done. The same fate awaited the statement of policy in the 1984 Plan of
Development that the town consider the purchase of all or part of the MDC land. It
was not until after the plaintiff announced its plans for the 33-acre parcel that the Town
Council ordered the contingency planning that had been called for ten years earlier.
Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 251-53.
141. The application by the Christian Activities Council, Congregational was sub
mitted to the town on February 3, 1994; the Town Council finally ordered the long
called for contingency planning "early in March 1994." Id. at 251. The Court summa
rizes the efforts of the town to designate the land as public open space, or to acquire it.
Id. at 251-53. Compare the Massachusetts Supreme Court's rejection of a town's at
tempt to condemn land on which a developer had proposed to build affordable hous
ing-the town claimed that the purpose of the condemnation was to provide parks and
recreation facilities. Pheasant Ridge Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Burlington, 506 N.E.2d 1152,
1156-58 (Mass. 1987).
142. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 253 (emphasis
added).
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diately after it discovered the plaintiff was proposing to build af
fordable housing on the small 33-acre parcel across the road from
the 500+ acres that comprised the vast majority of MDC land. Lest
some towns get the wrong idea about what seems to be another
easy way to avoid the impact of section 8-30g,143 the court did em
phasize the "long history" of the town's interest in the 33-acre site
for open space, which "precludes any possible inference of pretext
on the part of the town."144 Perhaps. The voters in North Haven
might be struck by the ease with which Glastonbury was able to
gain control over open space without paying a penny. North Ha
ven, like Glastonbury, had also long marked a particular parcel to
be used for open space and recreational purposes. 145 The town
board of selectmen voted to acquire or condemn the land only af
ter a developer had applied for approval of an affordable housing
project for the site.l 46 Interestingly, North Haven had to pay just
compensation for its condemnation of privately owned land to cre
ate public open space. 147 Glastonbury got its open space for free.
Finally, Christian Activities Council, Congregational ignores
the provision in Connecticut's zoning enabling statute which pro
vides that:
Such [zoning] regulations shall also encourage the development
of housing opportunities, including opportunities for multifamily
dwellings, consistent with soil types, terrain and infrastructure ca
pacity, for all residents of the municipality and the planning re
gion in which the municipality is located . . .. Such regulations
shall also promote housing choice and economic diversity in
housing, including housing for both low and moderate income
households, and shall encourage the development of housing
which will meet the housing needs identified in the housing plan
prepared pursuant to section 8-37t and in the housing component
and the other components of the state plan of conservation and
143. See supra notes 111-12 and infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text for a
discussion of ways of avoiding the force of section 8-30g..
144. Christian Activities Council, Congregational, 735 A.2d at 253.
145. See Peter Rock Assocs. v. Town of North Haven, 756 A.2d 335, 338 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that the town owed the plaintiff the "fair market value per
acre"), affd per curiam, 756 A.2d 290, 292 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000), cert. denied 761 A.2d
754 (Conn. 2000).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 348. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recently accepted certiorari
in another case where the town condemned land that was the subject of an affordable
housing appeal. This case is Avalonbay Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange, No.
99065826, 2000 WL 226374 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2000), and the Supreme Court
docket number is 16352.
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development prepared pursuant to section 16a-26. 148

The Court's decision in Christian Activities Council, Congregational
ignored, if it did not actually nullify, that legislative mandate as
well.
The Act as thus interpreted is hardly the revolutionary dragon
feared by some legislators when the statute was adopted 10 years
ago, nor the statute that since its enactment has annually been the
focus of major struggles for repeal or amendment. Nor is it a stat
ute that was still so controversial in the spring of 1999 that the
forces of repeal forced the supporters of the Appeals Act to agree
to establish a new commission to examine its workings and to rec
ommend necessary changes. 149
VI.

THE SECOND BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT AND THE
LEGISLATURE's RESPONSE

Supporters of affordable housing development in Connecticut
put the best face on the Report of BRC II and the legislation that
resulted,150 but it is clear that the Christian Activities Council, Con
gregational decision has severely crippled the affordable housing ef
fort in Connecticut, and that the year 2000 affordable housing
amendments have redirected its course. The legislation increases
the percentage of units that must be affordable in order for a devel
opment to qualify as an affordable housing development protected
by section 8-30g. In what the legislation now formally terms "set
aside affordable housing developments" (those not receiving gov
ernmental assistance), 30% of the units must be affordable, and
they must remain affordable for 40 years. 151
148. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2 (1999) (emphasis added). Research undertaken for
the second Blue Ribbon Commission indicated that less than half of Connecticut's mu
nicipalities have complied with this statutory mandate. BRC II, supra note 11, at 20.
149. Senator Eric Coleman, a supporter of section 8-30g and co-chair of the sec
ond Blue Ribbon Commission, said later that every year so much legislative time had to
be devoted to debating the numerous proposed amendments to section 8-30g that not
enough time remained to properly consider other housing legislation; normal legislative
business was being "held hostage" to the revision or repeal of section 8-30g. Eric D.
Coleman, Introductory Remarks at Understanding the Amendments to Connecticut's
Affordable Housing Statute Conference, New Britain, Conn. (Sept. 8, 2000).
150. See Connecticut Housing Coalition, Housing Highlights of the 2000 Legisla
tive Session (n.d.) (on file with author). "The compromise forged by the Blue Ribbon
Commission experienced some further compromise during the legislative process, but
the final version was supported by the Coalition and other advocates, and adopted the
final night of the session .... The House defeated an amendment to totally repeal the
Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure by an encouragingly strong vote of 92-48." Id.
151. Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, Pub. Act No. 00-206, 2000 Conn. Acts 962, 963
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While assisted housing-housing which does receive govern
mental financial assistance-can continue to use the section 8-30g
procedure as before, under the new legislation private developers
must rent or sell a higher percentage of their units at below market
prices, meaning that the prices of the market rate units will have to
go up to cover the increased internal subsidy required.1 52 The rhet
oric of the proponents of this change is that it will increase the
amount of truly affordable housing that is built. The contrary is
more likely to be true, as for-profit developers-the key153 to pro
viding affordable housing other than in a form akin to the much
detested public housing-are less likely to participate. The 40-year
requirement compounds the problem for the for-profit developer
without a government subsidy; for example, planners assume the
average life of a residential house is only 20 years.
Two new forms are now required to take advantage of section
8-30g. The affordable housing developer must submit an "Af
ford ability Plan" and a "Conceptual Site Plan." The Affordability
Plan is a new idea, and appears to be part of the new and broader
view that the purpose of section 8-30g is to facilitate the provision
of more very low-cost publicly supported housing. The Commis
sioner of Economic and Community Development is to issue regu
lations on Affordability Plans, which will include a formula on how
to determine rent levels and sale prices, how to equate family size
and maximum rental and sale prices for affordable housing, etc.
The Affordability Plan must also include the designation of the per
son or entity that will be responsible for ensuring that the income
limits set by the statute are complied with over the 40 year period
(if they are enforced by covenants in the deeds) as well as any other
restrictions required by section 8-30g; the sequence in which the
affordable and market rate units will be built in the case of a set
aside project; and draft zoning regulations, covenants, deeds, and
other documents intended to impose the income restrictions re
quired by the Appeals ACt. 154
(Reg. Sess.) (amending § 8-30g) (substituting a new set of definitions in section 1). The
new definition for "set-aside development" added the 30% and 40-year requirements to
the necessary qualifications for use of the Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure. Id.
152. See supra note 72 for a discussion of the cross-subsidy mechanism.
153. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relative
importance of for-profit and non-profit developers in bulding affordable housing.
154. See 2000 Conn. Acts at 963 (providing the definition of an "Affordability
Plan," under new section 8-30g(b)(1)(E), which requires submission of "draft zoning
regulations, conditions of approvals, deeds, restrictive covenants or lease provisions
that will govern affordable dwelling units").
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It is hard to evaluate the significance of the new statutory per

mission for towns to require the submission of a Conceptual Site
Plan as part of an application to change a zone to allow construc
tion of affordable housing on a site. ISS Since 1977, section 8-30(g)
of the Connecticut Statutes has authorized towns to require the
submission of conceptual site plans to aid the commission in deter
mining the conformity of any proposed building with the zoning
regulations, so long as that requirement was stated in the town's
regulations. Five years ago Kaufman v. Zoning Commission of
Danbury specifically held that section 8-30(g) applies to zone
change requests as well as to other zoning permit applications, if the
requirement is in the town's regulations.1 s6 Danbury's regulations
. did not require such a submission so it could not rely on the appli
cant's failure to submit a site plan as a justification for rejection of
the developer's proposal. I S7 In any event, the section 8-30g amend
ment adds explicit permission to require submission of a Concep
tual Site Plan as part of a zoning amendment request if that
application would permit the construction of affordable housing.
The amendment is a recognition that for some time we in fact have
used zone changes to regulate individual parcels contrary to funda
mental zoning assumptions such as the uniformity rule.
The new amendment to section 8-30g on site plans is confusing,
however, because it does not at first glance appear to change the
law at all. Both Kaufman and the amendment permit a zoning
commission to require a site plan in connection with a request for a
zone change, and both Kaufman and the amendment permit a com
mission to impose that requirement only if that requirement is in
the town's regulations. What is new is that the section 8-30g
amendment limits what may be required in the site plan submitted
with a zone change application to allow the building of an afforda
ble housing project, whereas Kaufman did not place any restrictions
on the information that could be required to be submitted as part of
a site plan.
The new amendment limits the information to be collected to
"the proposed development's total number of residential units and
155. New section 8-30g(c) authorizes commissions, if they wish, to require sub
mission of Conceptual Site Plans of applicants for a zone change that would allow con
struction of an affordable housing development.
156. 653 A.2d 798, 805 ("[Z]oning commissions may require the submission of
site plans for all zone change applications ....") (emphasis added).
157. See id. (stating that the Commission conceded that the plaintiff's application
was sufficient without site plans).
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their arrangement on the property and the proposed development's
roads and traffic circulation, sewage disposal and water supply."158
These may be the core of a conceptual site plan, but site plans as
used in Connecticut, and as authorized in Kaufman, have required
much more. 159 The new amendment in effect prohibits requiring
such additional information when applying for a zone change to
construct affordable housing. This provides significant protection
for an affordable housing application being heard by an unsympa
thetic commission endlessly demanding more information-a pro
cedure which significantly increases the start up costs that must be
incurred before the developer knows whether an approval is even
possible.
On the other hand, two of the members of the Second Blue
Ribbon Commission, speaking at a Connecticut Bar Association
sponsored conference discussing the amendments to section 8-30g,
managed to expand the definition of what might "logically" be re
quired in the Conceptual Site Plan. According to them, such plans
should include, for example, improvements to off-site traffic pat
terns; "[t]opographical information on existing and final grades ...
and estimated amount of blasting;" location of wetlands, streams,
and proposed utility lines; location of pedestrian walks; floor plans
of all units proposed; report on existing and proposed storm water
distribution, including the capability of off-site drainage facilities; an
analysis that assures that remaining sewer line capacity after devel
opment would be sufficient to accommodate a reasonable build out
under the town's plan of development, etc.l 60 One superior court
decision provides the justification for much of this imposing list. 161
All of this information and more is justifiably required before the
commission approves an application, of course. But the statute sim
ply requires a "Conceptual" Site Plan. To transform this into the
expensive generation of information suggested when the initial ap
158. 2000 Conn. Acts at 964 (new § 8-30g(c».
159. For an example of a conceptual site plan regulation requiring more, see the
site plan regulation for Fairfield, Connecticut, quoted in SSM Associates Ltd. Partner
ship v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 545 A.2d 602, 604 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988), affd,
559 A.2d 196 (Conn. 1989) (stating that the site plan required information on the pro
posal's impact on, inter alia, the "appearance and beauty of the community").
160. Richard Redness & Diane Fox, Conceptual Site Plans under the Amended
Statute, in Understanding the Amendments of the Connecticut Affordable Housing
Statute (Sept. 8, 2000) (unpublished manuscript at 94-95) (on file with author).
161. See Fairfield 2000 Homes Corp. v. Town of Newtown Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, No. CV9705787565, 1999 WL 186768, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1999)
(holding that a zoning commission may deny an application based on environmental
harm to the residences).
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plication for a zone change is made-unless that zone change is the
only approval the developer needs in order to commence construc
tion-is to impose a significant burden on an affordable housing
developer before there is any indication as to whether the idea is
remotely acceptable. The requirement is even more suspect when it
is not imposed on market rate construction.
The other major change adopted by the Second Blue Ribbon
Commission was the creation of a limited moratorium procedure to
shield towns from section 8-30g lawsuits if they are in fact approv
ing affordable housing projects, even though the percentage of af
fordable housing units in the town is less than 10% of the town's
housing stock. The original version of section 8-30g included a 1
year moratorium for towns participating in an affordable housing
compact, but this provided no incentive to a town that was attempt
ing to increase its amount of affordable housing. 162 For example,
using the old moratorium's formula and applying it to Glaston
bury's housing stock numbers for the year 2000, 125 units of afford
able housing would have to be added to its housing stock for it to
gain a 1 year exemption, after which it would become subject to
section 8-30g lawsuits again. That is a very large number of new
units to be added to the housing stock of a town the size of Glaston
bury in 1 year.
The new moratorium provision increases the length of the mor
atorium on section 8-30g lawsuits to 3 years, a more realistic period
of time in which to demand a significant increase in affordable
housing stock if the moratorium is to continue. 163 To be entitled to
the moratorium, the Commissioner of Economic and Community
Development must issue a certification of completion for a certain
number of affordable housing units. l64 The number is arrived at by
a complicated point formula that provides differing point levels
based on whether the unit is owned or rented, whether the rent or
payment levels are appropriate for persons earning 80% or 60% of
the area's median income, or whether the unit is a market rate unit
in an affordable housing development.165 Units of housing built
since the effective date of section 8-30g are counted in the point
accumulations, providing a sort of ex post facto reward for those
towns that did allow the construction of affordable housing during
162.
163.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(g) (1999).
2000 Conn. Acts at 967.

164.
165.

[d.
[d. at 967-68.
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the last 10 years even though no effective reward then existed for
doing SO.166 The town is not shielded from section 8-30g lawsuits,
however, if the rejected application is for an affordable housing de
velopment in which the affordable units are government-assisted,
and either there are 40 or fewer dwelling units (market rate or as
sisted), or 95% of the units are restricted to persons whose income
is 60% or less of the area's median income.1 67
The Commission was successful in reversing the unfortunate
holding in Christian Activities Council, Congregational that the
"sufficient evidence" standard required specifically in section 8
30g(c)(1)(A), also applies by implication to subsections (B), (C),
and (D) which do not specify any evidentiary standard. 168 A suffi
cient evidence standard requires less from the commission, which
carries the burden of supporting its decision, than would the more
usual preponderance of the evidence standard. The plaintiff in
Christian Activities Council, Congregational argued that subsections
(B), (C), and (D) require the town to carry its burden by a prepon
derance of the evidence, since that is the traditional standard. 169
The court disagreed, finding that by close textual analysis it could
be seen that all four sections were interrelated and hence the lesser
"sufficient evidence" standard applied in all four instances. 17o The
Christian Activities Council, Congregational interpretation leads to
the anomalous situation in which a remedial statute designed to in
crease the amount of affordable housing ends up requiring a less
demanding standard of judicial review of a commission's adverse
decision than is presently required for similar land use decisions not
involving affordable housing.l7l The Blue Ribbon Commission rec
ommended the reversal of that interpretation, and the legislature
agreed; a period was placed at the end of section 8-30g(c)(1)(A)
replacing the semicolon in the original legislation, to emphasize that
the sufficient evidence standard does not apply to subsections
166.
167.

Id.
Id. For a clear example of how the point calculations are to be made see
Raphael Podolsky & Brian Miller, Moratorium Eligibility Under P.A. 00-206, in Under
standing the Amendments of Connecticut's Affordable Housing Statute, supra note 162

(manuscript at 175).
168. Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, 735 A.2d 231,
239-46 (Conn. 1999).
169. Id. at 239-40.
170.

Id.

171. BRC II, supra note 11, at 12, 29 (recommending a clarification of the judicial
review standard and discussing the significance of this recommendation by the propos
ing subcommittee).
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(c)(l)(B), (C), and (D).172
A potential problem remains, however, since the legislature re
fused to adopt the second Blue Ribbon Commission Report's rec
ommendation number 7, which would have modified "need" in
section 8-30g(c)(1)(C) of the Connecticut General Statutes173 so
that the need would be determined regionally rather than locally or
statewide.174 The Commission's change would have reversed the
holding in Christian Activities Council, Congregational that the un
defined word "need" meant local or municipal need. Members of
the second Blue Ribbon Commission decided not to press for the
addition of the word "regional," however, since the Connecticut
zoning statutes already required a regional focus for land use deci
sions. Section 8-2 requires zoning regulations to "encourage the de
velopment of housing opportunities . . . for all residents of the
municipality and the planning region in which the municipality is
located. "175 Identical language is in section 8-23, concerning the
town's plan of conservation and development which section 8-2 in
turn requires a zoning commission to consider when it adopts zon
ing regulations.176 Thus, satisfaction of the region's housing needs
is already required of Connecticut towns, contrary to the narrow
interpretation of "need" III Christian Activities Council,
Congregational.
VII.

CRITIQUE OF SECTION 8-30g

Several shortcomings in the Appeals Act became apparent
during the decade after its initial enactment. None were success
fully addressed by the second Blue Ribbon Commission, because it
is not easy to determine how to resolve these difficulties.
First, we did not consider how to limit a town's ability to block
affordable housing proposals by refusing to supply the necessary
infrastructure for an affordable housing development. Without
public sewers, for example, at least an acre of land is required for
each dwelling unit; with public sewers, the density limitation be
comes unimportant and the cost of housing units drops. The Ap
peals Act does not apply to appeals from local water and sewer
172. Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, Pub. Act No. 00-206, 2000 Conn. Acts 962, 965
(Reg. Sess.).
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-30g(c)(1)(C) (1999) (providing that "such public in
terests clearly outweigh the need for affordable housing").
174. BRC II, supra note 11, at 10.
175. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2(a) (1999).
176. § 8-23( a).
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commissions. In fact, it is well established that decisions of water
and sewer commissions are virtually unappealable. l77 Moreover,
Connecticut passed a "sewer avoidance law" in the 1970s, which
encourages towns to avoid building sewers because of the increased
population densities and concomitant environmental problems that
seemed likely to followP8
Second, we did not figure out how to deal with neighbors.
They have intervened in several of the court cases, in at least one of
which the town and developer had already agreed to a much-nego
tiated plan only to have the neighbors object. 179 Neighbors can
often win simply by delaying a project.
Third, eminent domain has turned out to be an unassailable
technique for defeating an affordable housing development. At
least 5 towns have now used eminent domain to condemn a site that
is the subject of an affordable housing application. This is a costly
defense of a town's "right" to exclude the poor, but it does work
and until recently has been judicially approved. 180
Fourth, expert testimony (i.e., the development would pollute
groundwater at the proposed location) will be the primary means
by which a town can carry its burden of proving that its rejection of
an application was not pretextual. It is quite surprising, therefore,
to see how casually towns have defended their decisions on points
that they probably could have carried if they had brought in an ex
pert on their side. The Connecticut rule provides that the commis
sion can believe or disbelieve an expert if it wishes, but it can only
reject an application that is supported by expert testimony by rely
ing on experts who support an opposing view. 181 For a relatively
small expenditure, a town could hire an expert to appear before the
177. See Archambault v. Water Pollution Control Auth., 523 A.2d 931, 933-34
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (applying a legislative standard for review of WPCA decisions
on the extension of sewers, and holding that the municipality has discretion to decide
where sewers will and will not go, subject to judicial review only for "fraud, oppression,
or arbitrary action"). See generally Lord, Sewers and Growth Control (1996) (unpub
lished paper) (on file with author).
178. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-245 to 7-250 (1999).
179. Centennial Dev., Inc. v. Town of Farmington, No. CV 92-0517405S, 1993
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1511, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 9, 1993).
180. See Peter Rock Assocs. v. Town of North Haven, 756 A.2d 335, 345 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1998); Glastonbury Affordable Hous. Dev., Inc. v. Town Council, No. CV94
0543581, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 52342, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1996). But
see Avalonbay Cmtys., Inc. v. Town of Orange, No. CV 99065826, 2000 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 372, at *26 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 2000).
181. E.g., Huck v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency (Greenwich), 525
A.2d 940, 948-49 (Conn. 1987).
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commission to provide support for its view and would have an ex
cellent chance of winning any appeal if one is taken.
Fifth, the FHA will not insure any mortgage for a property that
is subject to resale restrictions, such as a limitation on a unit's resale
price. 182 Yet, without being able to impose a resale restriction on
the developer and its tenants or buyers, a town probably cannot
ensure that any density bonus it gives the affordable housing devel
oper will not make its way into the developer's pocket (as it might if
the developer were free to rent or sell the affordable housing units
at full market price). HUD has, in effect, given towns a very simple
means of stopping affordable housing proposals; the town simply
requires a resale restriction, and the developer cannot get insurance
from HUD. Some developers have persuaded banks to forego
HUD insurance by observing that funding for affordable housing
will look good on Community Reinvestment Act reports. 183 There
may be other strategies, but, when pressed, HUD reportedly insists
that its policy must prevail.
Finally, some "carrots" were provided in the first Blue Ribbon
Commission Report-primarily economic incentives. These were
all underfunded or not funded at all. In addition, however, we
should have added other rewards for encouraging affordable hous
ing-most obviously exempting towns from the reach of the Ap
peals Act if they are actively complying with an acceptable
affordable housing development plan like the first Capitol Region
Housing Compact. The exemption should be finely tuned to take
into account the number of units approved, for example, and the
degree to which that approval increased the town's supply of af
fordable housing.
CONCLUSION

Connecticut seems to have accepted the Appeals Act's crea
tion of an enforceable obligation on towns to consider affordable
housing applications as a separate class of applications which can
not be rejected for the usual reasons. This is a sea-change from 10
years ago, when nearly half the legislators voted against the adop
tion of section 8-30g even when it was part of a package with ext en
182. See 24 c.F.R. § 203.41(b) (2000) for the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development policy against restrictions on the use of properties that the federal
government insures through the FHA.
183. See 12 U.S.c. § 2906(a) (1994) (requiring banks to file reports on the
amount of loans they have made to the communities in which their branches are
located).
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sive (though, as it turned out, never fulfilled) commitments to
provide funding and bonuses to towns that approved affordable
housing projects. Moreover, the legislature did not attempt to over
ride the part of the Supreme Court's decision in Christian Activities
Council, Congregational that changed the entrenched rule that
commissions did not have to give reasons for their decisions (as
long as a court reviewing the case could find evidence to support
the decision). That will go a long way toward leveling the field on
which the applicant and commission are playing.
At the same time, the Appeals Act has been transformed.
When adopted 10 years ago, the primary thrust of the Appeals Act
was to reduce housing costs at the lower end of the income scale.
We attempted to reduce the delays in municipal approval proce
dures that increased housing costs; we added a technique-the
builder's remedy-that allowed a pecuniarily interested party to
challenge a dilatory commission or a commission that was other
wise hostile to the building of affordable housing in its town; we
provided a procedure whereby towns and developers could negoti
ate to accommodate each other's interests; and we did not demand
much from the town-an affordable housing project could be
turned down for any sound planning reason that rested on facts es
tablished in the decisional record. We did not establish any new
governmental agency as both Massachusetts and New Jersey had
done, nor did we increase the paperwork required to process an
affordable housing application as New Jersey had done.
The Appeals Act as amended in 2000 changes the focus from
reducing housing costs to increasing the number of the truly poor
who will benefit from the Appeals Act's appeals procedure. The
old Appeals Act could be satisfied with a minimum number of low
income housing units, and these were usually only affordable to the
very upper end of lower-income people. No unit needed to be de
signed to sell or rent to persons with incomes below 80% of the
area median income. Now at least 15% of the residents of a set
aside affordable housing development (a development built without
governmental financial assistance) must have incomes not exceed
ing 60% of the area's median income. 184 This downward shift in the
income level of the popUlation benefiting from the Appeals Act is
good, of course, but the Appeals Act now encourages development
of housing that is more like that built under the nearly defunct pub
184. Act effective Oct. 1, 2000, Pub. Act No. 00-206, 2000 Conn. Acts 962, 963
(Reg. Sess.).
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lic housing program, rather than a mechanism for reducing housing
costs at the lower (not lowest) end of the income spectrum.
A major consequence of the increased subsidy that becomes
necessary to provide housing for the very poor is that the subsidy
can no longer be provided very easily by cross-subsidies from the
market rate units in an affordable housing development. Builders
seeking to use the Act will be much more dependent on securing
governmental subsidies to make up the difference between what
the tenants can pay and what the housing actually costs. With that
greater dependency comes more forms and paperwork-and in
fact, the forms and paperwork and calculations necessary to qualify
a project as affordable have been built into the Act itself, even if
governmental subsidies are not sought. The new paperwork re
quirements include a Conceptual Site Plan,185 which must be sub
mitted with the initial application for a zone change; an
Affordability Plan;186
calculation of points a municipality has
earned toward a moratorium on the ability of developers to invoke
the section 8-30g procedure (certain applications are excepted);187
and an Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Plan. 188
Some of these adaitional requirements are designed to estab
lish greater protection for interests intended to be protected by the
original Appeals Act. That act did implicitly have a goal of racially
and economically integrating the suburbs. 189 That goal is explicit in
the new Fair Housing Marketing Plan requirement, in the lowering
of the income of the targeted population and the accompanying in
come certifications required to ensure that the lowered income
levels are met, as well as in the requirement for the preparation of
the Affordability Plan. 190 Nonetheless, the increased paperwork
will increase housing costs and will discourage private initiatives for
affordable housing development. The Second Blue Ribbon Com
mission recognized that the increased number of units that must be
provided to persons earning only 60% of the area income, and the
increased percentage of units that had to be set-aside as affordable
(from 25% to 30%), might actually reduce the number of low-in

a

185. /d. at 964.
186. Id. at 963.
187. Id. at 967.
188. Id. at 963.
189. Phillip Tegeler. The Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Plan, in Under
standing the Amendments of the Connecticut Affordable Housing Statute, supra note
162 (manuscript at 131-36).
190. 2000 Conn. Acts at 963.
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come units produced: "[ilt is possible that the cumulative changes
proposed to make even more of the housing proposed under the
statute affordable, may prove to be a disincentive to private devel
opers."191 Nonetheless, the Commission adopted these heightened
requirements because "the benefits of providing additional units for
lower income households was determined to outweigh the risk."l92
Some of the members of. the first Blue Ribbon Commission
had hoped that section 8-30g would provide a framework within
which developers and commissions could find a way to work out
their differences over affordable housing applications without
resorting to the expense and delay of litigation.1 93 We expected
that if we constrained the town's ability to stonewall an affordable
housing application, an affordable housing developer could be en
ticed into making compromises of its own to respond to the town's
stated problems with the application. All we .did was to require the
town to give good planning reasons for its decision, so that the de
veloper could respond to those reasons (if possible to do so). We
emphasized the importance of negotiations, by entitling the devel
oper to resubmit a disapproved application with changes, and have
that resubmitted application placed on a fast track to approval, or
disapproval followed by judicial review. We thought that simply re
quiring the town to state a good planning reason would reduce the
volatility and knee-jerk reactions toward affordable housing
proposals.
We were naIve. When Danbury's application rejection was re
versed by the Supreme Court because the town's reasons were dis
puted by the uncontradicted testimony of the town engineer
(testifying for the town), Danbury's Planning Director complained
that section 8-30g was "written by people who don't understand
zoning."194 Was he saying that zoning is understood as doing
whatever the town wants regardless of the law or of rules of evi
dence? Moreover, one would think that a statute that reinforced
the need for town commissions to produce decisions anchored in
good planning practices would cheer anyone interested in strength
ening planning as a fundamental part of zoning. Instead, more than
a few planners complained that requiring the town to give good
191. BRC II, supra note 11, at 23-24.
192. Id.
193. BRC I, supra note 4, at 11-12.
194. Peter J. Vodola, Post-Litigation Results of Affordable Housing Land Use
Appeals: A Survey of Statistics and Opinions Concerning Decisions Based on the Act,
1990-1994, at 19 (Jan. 7, 1995) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
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planning reasons for its decisions forced the town to give up all con
trol over how town land was used.
Section 8-30g began as an effort to simplify the zoning proce
dures governing affordable housing development applications and
to encourage developers and commissions to negotiate more and
litigate less. The biggest breakthrough has been the adoption by
the Connecticut Supreme Court of the rule that land use commis
sions must state the reasons for their decisions. This requirement
will not simplify the application process for affordable housing de
velopments, but it will remove a significant part of a town's ability
to turn down affordable housing developments for improper rea
sons. This should encourage commissions to negotiate more with
developers, which should shorten the time necessary to produce af
fordable housing projects. This should in turn reduce the cost of
producing affordable housing.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the use
of unsupported assertions as "reasons" for rejecting affordable
housing projects. The second Blue Ribbon Commission has in
creased the complexity of the reviews required for affordable hous
ing projects, so that instead of simplifying these applications we
have burdened them even more than before. The statute's attempt
to reduce the level of government intrusion into property law
claims has gone in the other direction. Even though the 1980s was
in general a period of increasing interest in reducing the level of
government intrusion in our lives, that greater acceptance of free
market solutions did not extend to zoning and planning law. That
law evidently strikes too close to home for us to want to take the
risks of less regulation. We want assurance that the regulators will
be our friends and neighbors.

